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THE HARMONIZATION MYTH IN
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

LAW

Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec*

There is a dominant narrative in international intellectual property ("IP") law of
ever-increasing harmonization. This narrative has been deployed in ways
descriptive, prescriptive, and instrumental: approximating the historical trend,
providing justification, and establishing the path forward. Appeals to harmonization
are attractive. They evoke a worldwide partnership and shared sacrifice to meet the
goals of innovation and access to technology through certainty, efficiency, and
increased competition through lowered trade barriers. Countries with strong IP
protections consistently and successfully tout the importance of certainty and lower
trade barriers when seeking new and stronger protections from countries with lower
levels of protection. Yet the harmonization narrative is a myth. Harmonization can
account for only some attributes of internationalIP law development, and even those
are often better explained by a maximalist account of IP protection.
Maximization of IP rights better explains much of the substance of international IP
law development, including the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

PropertyRights ("TRIPS"), which sets floors

but not ceilings for IP protections.

Maximization is particularly evident in the forum-shifting behavior that has resulted
in a proliferation of IP commitments in investment, bilateral, and regional trade
treaties in the years since the TRIPS Agreement went into effect. These commitments
often increase IP protection in signatory countries in ways that bring them out of
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harmony with the majority of the world. As a result, prior commitments to

harmonization are discardedfor maximization.
Through the lens of duration, this Article describes the harmonization narrativeand
its strength leading up to the TRIPS Agreement before showing the explanatory
superiority of a maximization narrative, even in the provisions of TRIPS. Next, the
Article shows how maximization of IP has driven many of the post-TRIPS treaties
and agreements at the expense of harmonization.Recognizing maximization instead
of harmonizationas the chief explanatorystory has a number of implicationsfor the
future of internationalIP law. It challenges the normative presumption that all
countries should have the same level of IP protection and weakens arguments that
countries ought to sacrifice their own national agendas in order to bring their IP
protection into harmony with other countries. Ultimately, correctly identifying the
trajectory of international IP law allows scholars and stakeholders to address
complicated problems with realistic expectations, rather than attractive but

flawed

rhetoric.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of international IP law is often told as a story of harmonization.1
It is a story with initially varied systems of protection, each geared towards domestic
1.
This Article uses the term "harmonization" to mean an effort to make laws
more uniform in both procedure and substance. The usage is generally in line with other
scholarly treatments of harmonization. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195-96
(2003) (discussing the U.S. interest in harmonizing copyright law with the European Union);
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industrial policy. Over time, these systems have become connected, inter-dependent,
and seemingly convergent through a series of treaties. These treaties originally
required only reciprocity but now specify minimum standards of protection and
enforcement provisions. The costs of abandoning domestic policy prioritiesparticularly for developing and least developed countries (the Global South)-were
worth it, proponents of the treaties assured, because of the benefits of
harmonization.2 Even skeptics adopted the harmonization framing in discussions of
required IP protections and flexibilities. 3
But this explanatory story, while attractive, is inaccurate. Time and again,
developed countries that benefit from high levels of protection (the Global North)
have chosen maximization of IP rights over harmonization.4 As it turns out, the
treaties that were hailed as instruments of harmonization were actually designed to
allow for unharmonized increases in protection. The real story is one of
maximization, not harmonization. Piecemeal increases of IP protections have
defined the last 25 years, but the harmonization myth persists.
This Article seeks to pull back the curtain on the harmonization myth and
argues that doing so carries important implications for the future. Recognizing
harmonization as a myth creates space in policymaking for giving increased weight
to considerations that were previously swept aside, such as meeting domestic
interests and encouraging increased experimentation in IP lawmaking.
The harmonization myth's origin story is telling. International
harmonization was not a consideration in early iterations of IP rights. 5 The default
rule for IP law is that it is territorial. Early copyright laws bolstered domestic
publishing industries and encouraged the development and dissemination of
Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright: Property Rights or Cultural
Progress?,6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 117 (1998) (describing "the desire to conform
U.S. law to the laws of other countries"); Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent
Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 89 (2007) (noting that the TRIPS Agreement "took a major step
toward substantive patent law harmonization" but did not result in "a uniform or deeply
harmonized global patent regime").
2.

See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL

186-94 (2000) (describing the potential trade gains from harmonization measures
contained in TRIPS); John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 694-703 (2002) (discussing three rationales for harmonization:
reducing free-riding by low-protection countries, the potential for economies of scale in
governance, and preventing destructive protectionism); John Gladstone Mills III, A
TransnationalPatent Conventionfor the Acquisition and Enforcement ofInternationalPatent
Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 958, 961 (2006) (asserting that many scholars
"endorse complete harmonization of the world's patent laws in order to create a single global
ECONOMY

patent" and that "the signing of the TRIPs Agreement gave support to the complete
harmonization approach"); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonizationand Its Discontents: A Case
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's PharmaceuticalSector, 97 CAL. L. REv. 1571,
1572-73 (2009) (describing the "refrain" of TRIPS as a harmonizing instrument and
critiquing harmonization).
3.
See, e.g., Kapczynski, supranote 2, at 1573.
4.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
5.
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particular forms of expression in countries that chose to implement them. Copyright
rationales were generally domestic, whether centered on the local printing industry,
authors, or national culture. Early patent systems, too, furthered domestic interests
in developing new technologies, developing industries that employed those
technologies, and introducing new goods to their local populations. 6 These patents
were grants by monarchs, countries, or states allowing exclusive rights to
manufacture and sell inventions for a limited time, and often designed for training
apprentices to make the goods widely available once the patent expired.
Instead, an interest in harmonization developed slowly and in parallel with
increasing international trade. The post-World War II General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs ("GATT") 7 led to growth in trade,8 and IP-intensive industries were no
exception to growing globalization. Domestic industry groups that had been fostered
by local IP protection expanded their interests and lobbied for protection in foreign
markets.9 By the late twentieth century, variations in IP laws were seen as a nontariff barrier to trade, setting the stage for the negotiations that led to the inclusion
of IP in the Uruguay Round Agreement (a.k.a. the "WTO Agreement" forming the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1994).10
Harmonization was a driving force behind the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the "TRIPS Agreement")," an annex to the
WTO Agreement and one of a number of treaties addressing non-tariff barriers to
trade." The idea behind TRIPS was that firms would hesitate to locate
manufacturing centers in a country without IP protection because of the potential

6.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
7.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
8.
See Douglas Irwin, The GATT in HistoricalPerspective, 85 AM. ECON. REV.
323, 326-27 (1995) (describing the post-war economic expansion in trade and income and
attributing it in part to the GATT).
9.

E.g., STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE

INTERNATIONAL

PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND

ARTISTIC PROPERTY 615-16 (1938) (noting how "the interests of producers and consumers of
copyrighted works are now truly of an international character" as an explanation for "the large
number of international associations and organizations that are now attempting to promote
copyright and the interests concerned with copyright").
10.
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. I,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
11.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
12.

See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS & TEXT 410-12 (4th ed. 2002); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec,
Free Trade in Patented Goods: InternationalExhaustionfor Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 317, 319 (2014) [hereinafter Rajec, Free Trade] (noting that concerns over non-tariff
barriers to trade resulted in the inclusion in the WTO of "agreements addressing subjects as
diverse as telecommunication, industrial and product safety standards, and intellectual
property").
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misappropriation of their IP rights.13 Varied and uncertain levels of IP protection
could also present high information costs to those trying to conduct business on the
Internet.14 These increased information costs can include determining the different
levels of IP protection in multiple jurisdictions before determining where to place
manufacturers and distributors, and in which fora to sell-or to avoid sales.
Companies often tailor their activities to avoid liability under IP laws, so more
jurisdictions with largely different protections means more determinations and
potential changes in manufacture and distribution to comply with the varied rules.
Differences in IP protection would therefore thwart one of the purposes of lowering
trade barriers, which is to allow for countries with competitive advantages in certain
sectors-e.g., manufacturing-to specialize, while other countries specialize in
other industries." In addition to thwarting specialization, differential IP protection
would increase border costs and prove to be a barrier to trade because of the need to
stop imports of infringing goods manufactured abroad. Ultimately, in return for the
promise of greater access to foreign markets for textiles and other goods, countries
in the Global South agreed to implement certain minimum standards of IP protection
through the TRIPS Agreement. The standards generally tracked the levels of
protection available in the Global North, even requiring some developed countries
to expand their protection to match that of other developed countries. Overall, the
TRIPS Agreement required sweeping changes and steep increases of IP protection
of many countries and provided the possibility of harmonization. By requiring
protection for specified subject matters and for specified terms, the basic scope of
IP rights was set. And all this change, we are told, was made pursuant to a goal of
harmonization, the key to lowering barriers to trade in creative and innovative
industries.
This Article joins the voices that have noted the ways that the TRIPS
Agreement has served as a "floor" for IP rights while allowing for future increases;
it does so by examining the course of one of the centerpieces of IP rights
harmonization: duration. Of all the reforms to IP rights pursued in the name of
harmonization, term is arguably the most important. The minimum standards set for
copyright and patent terms were among the strongest harmonizing provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement, particularly when coupled with subject matter requirements.
This is because the term of protection is, essentially, an on-off switch with respect
to IP rights. If terms differ between countries, then there will be some period of time

13.
See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the
Global IntellectualPropertyRegime, 41 CONN. L. REv. 861, 892 (2009) (describing the trade
purposes behind TRIPS and critiquing it as static and drawn towards exploiting developed

countries' "comparative advantage in production of intangible knowledge goods").

&

14.
See, e.g., ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB
BINDS THE WORLD IN COMMERCE 142-43 (2013).
15.
See PAUL R. KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY

POLICY 24 (Sally Yagan et al. eds., 9th ed. 2012). The book explains the general idea
comparative advantage and how lower trade barriers result in greater efficiency
manufacture because the costs associated with cross-border trade are lowered. Id. If
constitutes a barrier to placing manufacturing in the country with an advantage
manufacturing, then the differences in IP protection constitute a barrier to trade. Id.

of
in
IP
in
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in which there is protection in one country and not the other. This is precisely the
type of non-tariff barrier that TRIPS was meant to address.
Imagine the inefficiency of setting up a factory in a country to manufacture
innovative widgets, knowing that five years before the patent term ends in the rest
of the world, it will expire in the country of manufacture. Inventors (and investors)
would be less likely to place a factory in such a country, thwarting the aim of
specialization entirely. Similarly, if countries barred entire subject matters from
patentability that were protected elsewhere, it would distort trade and investment
decisions around that industry. 16 To ensure harmonized protection, the TRIPS
Agreement specified required subject matter protection for patents and copyrights
as well as minimum terms of protection. In the case of patents, the term of protection
"shall not end before" 20 years from the effective filing date of the patent
application. 17 For copyright, the required term is no less than life of the author plus
50 years, 18 and for works not based on the life of a natural person, no less than 50
years from publication.19
And yet even for questions of term-where the case for harmonization is
the strongest-a gentle push exposes that harmonization was not indeed the
motivating force. For example, it is certainly curious that, given the push for
harmonization, while the TRIPS Agreement was being negotiated, the European
Union ("EU") was negotiating to increase copyright terms by 20 years. 20 If
harmonization were indeed as valuable a goal as interest groups and the Global
North suggested before the TRIPS Agreement, one would expect that further treatymaking would be focused on, well, further harmonization. Instead, however, a
strong trend in treaty-making resulted in increased copyright and patent termschanges that have brought countries out of harmonization with other WTO member
countries.2
This Article pulls on that thread. It traces term requirements to TRIPSand then beyond-to show that when faced with a choice between lower-butharmonized protection and higher-but-disharmonized protection, the countries and
industry groups that have pushed for changes in the name of IP rights
"harmonization" over the years regularly chose maximization instead.

16.
The TRIPS Agreement also specifies requirements to be eligible for
protection. For patents, those requirements state that "patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application," whereas for
copyrights, the TRIPS Agreement requires protection extend to expressions, but not to "ideas
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such." TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 11, arts. 9, 27.
17.
Id. art. 33.
18.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
7, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102
Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention], incorporated through TRIPS
Agreement, supranote 11, art. 9.
19.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 12.
20.
See discussion infra Part III.
21.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
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The maximization story continues. Copyright term increases spread from
the EU to the United States, bolstered by a TRIPS Agreement exception from the
rule of reciprocity which allowed European countries to grant American authors
shorter terms of protection than their own nationals, consistent with the American
term.2 2 The United States responded by increasing its copyright term. Now, the
United States has included the requirement of a longer copyright term in a number
of bilateral and regional trade treaties.23 Patent term extension provisions have also
become a part of post-TRIPS Agreement treaties. These provisions require countries
to allow for the extension of patent terms under certain circumstances. In contrast to
copyright, these extensions can result in even more diversity among terms because
each extension is subject to an administrative procedure and these procedures are
more likely to vary from country to country. Nevertheless, countries of the Global
North have insisted on including these provisions that result in a lack of
harmonization between countries.
The harmonization narrative, thus, is ultimately an unsatisfactory
explanation for international IP rights. And because harmonization does not justify
many of the recent changes in IP commitments, its force as a determinant of futurelooking policy deserves scrutiny and skepticism. The treaty provisions that result in
pressure to maximize rights, such as the so-called rule of the shorter term, become
particularly suspect. For example, the United States' decision to increase the
copyright term was directly tied to the notion that American creators were
disadvantaged in European markets because they were granted shorter copyrights
than European nationals." When the myth is busted, one can make a more nuanced
calculation of costs and benefits for term changes. Increases in copyright terms can
result in an "upward ratchet"" of rights that is unmoored from the ideal term of
protection.
Similarly, recognizing the harmonization myth also calls for reevaluating
the benefits of variation among IP regimes. Diversity among IP regimes can be
important to respond to domestic needs that vary from country to country. It also
allows for some amount of experimentation. There is no strong empirical data
showing that the current terms of copyright or patent protection are ideal, so

22.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
23.
See, e.g., United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, June 30, 2007,46 I.L.M.
642, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter
KORUS]; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter
NAFTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-fulltext (last visited July 13, 2020); Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership,
GOVERNMENT
OF
CANADA,
https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptppptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng (last visited July 13, 2020) [hereinafter CPTPP].
24.
See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
25.

See generally SUSAN

COUNTERFEITING

SELL, THE GLOBAL IP UPWARD RATCHET, ANTI-

AND PIRACY ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS:

http://www.ip-watch.org/files/SusanSellfinalversion.pdf.

THE STATE OF PLAY

(2008),
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allowing for some diversity allows for more information to be gathered in a
"laboratories of experimentation" kind of way. 2 6
None of this is to suggest that harmonization has no role to play in
international IP protection. There are efficiencies when the general structure of
rights available are the same, both to IP rights holders and to third parties for whom
standardization can lower information costs. 27 Rather, what this Article suggests is
a recalibration of the weight that should be given to harmonization. Because there is
not consistent interest in a unified system of IP protection, there is room for
variation. And that variation may well provide value. Removing the implicit
preference for harmonization-and revising the narrative that harmonization is what
has been happening all along-will allow for clearer evaluation of the international
IP regime. All myths eventually clash with reality; harmonization is no exception.

I. THE HARMONIZATION NARRATIVE
Patent and copyright law both developed as highly localized laws, focused
on the needs and interests of local populations. However, as international trade has
increased, one potential barrier to trade is variation in IP protection between
countries. "International intellectual property law" is admittedly a misnomer
because "there are no intellectual property rights that are international in scope. "28
Instead, patents and copyrights remain territorial rights-that is, each country's laws
govern the grant of IP rights in that country, which in turn apply to goods and
activities within their borders. 29 Early IP laws were both territorial and diverse. Over
time, however, a steady stream of bilateral and multilateral treaties has imposed
requirements of reciprocity, national treatment, and eventually, minimum standards
of protection on members. These commitments have smoothed out differences
between the various countries' protections. As a result, the substance of IP rights
and procedures for procuring them have become more similar and standardized than
their early forms, which varied even among municipalities. 30 Bilateral and
multilateral treaties culminating in the TRIPS Agreement have included
requirements that have shaped IP rights into similar forms, scopes, and durations.
Post-TRIPS, regional IP agreements have included more specific requirements for
the grant of patents and copyrights, even as their implementation and enforcement
26.
See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REv.
65, 121 (2015) (suggesting that the "biggest hurdle to experimentation with substantive patent
law is the international TRIPS agreement").
27.
See Duffy, supra note 2, at 700.
28.
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL
PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 2-3 (2d ed. 2012).

INTELLECTUAL

29.
See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527, 531
(1972). For discussions of extraterritorial application of U.S. patent laws, see, for example,
Bernard Chao, Patent Imperialism, 109 Nw. U. L. REv. ONLINE 77 (2014); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement Damages, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1745, 1746 (2017); Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73 (2017); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Infringement, Unbound, 32 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 117 (2018).
30.
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent
Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 163 (2013) [hereinafter Rajec, EvaluatingFlexibility] (discussing
the early protections granted by Venice and municipalities within Germany).
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remains a matter for national legislatures and courts.31 Many of the changes required
to meet minimum standards resulted in developing and least developed countries
significantly increasing the level of protection embodied in their IP laws 32-at times
implementing entirely new systems of protection.33 Time and again, countries and
interest groups seeking such changes justified them as necessary for the purposes of
harmonization.34
This Part first describes the purposes served by patent and copyright law,
generally. Next, the Part traces the development of so-called international IP
protection; the emergence of relatively similar systems-ultimately enshrined in
international treaties-of IP protection that have been promulgated globally; and the
justifications offered for those protections. It ends with a discussion of the role of
divergent term length in international IP protection.

31.
See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent
Convention), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 (establishing the European Patent Office); Eurasian
Patent Convention, Aug. 12, 1994, available at Industrial Property and Copyright (July/Aug.
1995) (International Bureau of WIPO trans.), compiled in Industrial Property Laws and
Treaties: Multilateral Treaties, WIPO Pub. No. 609(E) (establishing Eurasian Patent
Organization and Eurasian Patent Office); Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration
(Cartagena Agreement), May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (the Andean Pact to "make decisions"
regulating IP and its 1994 Decision harmonizing much of the patent law and Decision 351
harmonizing copyright and neighboring rights); Agreement on the Creation of the African
Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO), Dec. 9, 1976, http://www.wipo.int
/clea/docnew/en/zz/zz001en.html (processes patent applications under 1984 protocol);
Bangui Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization
(OAPI), Mar. 2, 1977, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/details/227 (last visited July 21,
2020) (administers patents and copyrights in French-speaking African countries). All
discussed in PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE,
PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 174 (4th ed. 2015).

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL

32.
For example, South Africa, India, and Brazil treated pharmaceutical products
differently than other inventions under their patent systems prior to the TRIPS Agreement
and had to modify their respective positions to comply with TRIPS. See M. Monirul Azam,
The Experiences of TRIPS-Compliant PatentLaw Reforms in Brazil, India, and South Africa
and Lessons for Bangladesh, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 61, 96-97 (2015). The change to
granting patent protection over pharmaceutical products was non-trivial. See generally Jean
0. Lanjouw, The Introduction of PharmaceuticalProduct Patents in India: "Heartless
Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering"? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 6366, 1998) (discussing the controversy around requiring pharmaceutical patent
protection in the TRIPS Agreement).
33.
Least developed country members of the TRIPS Agreement remain under a
grace period that is meant to last until they reach "a sound a viable technological base," a
grace period that has been extended numerous times. INNOVATION IN THE LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES:

GOING

BEYOND

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS,

UNITED

NATIONS

CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. 2 (2007), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/ldcrh2_en.pdf. Most
recently, the grace period was extended with respect to pharmaceutical products until 2033.
WTO Members Agree to Extend Drug PatentExemptionfor PoorestMembers, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/newse/news15_e/trip_06novl5_e.htm.
34.
See discussion infra Section I.C.
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A. The Varied Purposes of IP Rights
Patents for inventions and copyrights for creative works are exclusive
rights of limited duration, which are justified, to varying extents, by a combination
of utilitarian goals and theories of moral rights in creations. Prospective, exclusive
rights are certainly not the only means of encouraging or rewarding inventors and
artists,35 and countries have varied greatly in when and how they have given such
encouragement in the past. Patents and copyrights are both government-granted
rights that embody policy goals of encouraging and rewarding artistic creation and
scientific discovery and dissemination. And although the goals and the balances they
strike in achieving those goals differ, they have come to be grouped together and
collectively termed "intellectual property."
Whatever the merits of this grouping, there are some characteristics that
patents and copyrights share. Both encourage the creation of information-and
goods embodying that information. The information embodied in such goods is
nonrivalrous and nonexclusive; that is, new embodiments can be made by studying
existing embodiments, without incurring the costs of creation. Absent protections,
then, investments in the creation of such goods may be appropriated, leading to an
underproduction. Copyright law, therefore, is intended to encourage original
expression through art, literature, and other media and its distribution through the
grant of exclusive rights to copy and distribute artistic works. Patent law is intended
to encourage investment in innovation and the sale of inventive goods through the
grant of exclusive rights to make, use, and sell goods that embody inventions.
Both patents and copyrights are rights of limited duration, ensuring that the
ideas embodied in artistic and inventive works will ultimately become part of the
public domain, available for enjoyment or to be built upon in future works. By
granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors, copyright and patent laws
represent a trade-off, decreasing public access and use of the protected information
during the term of the right. However, as rights of limited term, the subject matter
reverts to the public domain. Copyright term now lasts for generations, whereas
patents generally have a term of 20 years from the date an application is filed.3 6
There are competing justifications for copyright law, both within and
among jurisdictions, that have shaped the characteristics of the rights granted. It is
generally understood that the continental European tradition of copyright law is
based on a natural rights theory that requires protections of authors' moral rights
while common law countries take a more utilitarian approach. 7 The natural rights

35.
See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REv. 303 (2013) (discussing various methods of
encouraging innovation).
See discussion infra Part IV.
36.
37.
COPYRIGHT'S

See GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 31, at 193; PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 138 (1994)

(discussing the "hard, utilitarian calculus that balances the needs of copyright producers
against the needs of copyright consumers."); see also B. Zhorina Khan, An Economic History
of Copyright in Europe and the United States, ECON. HIST. ASS'N (Mar. 16, 2008),
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/an-economic-history-of-copyright-in-europe-and-the-unitedstates//.
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theory of copyright draws from a labor theory of property and suggests that authors
gain rights through their creative acts. According to the utilitarian view, encouraging
the production and dissemination of art benefits society, and exclusivity results in
more artistic activity than would exist without the inducement. 38 These are
oversimplifications, and each tradition carries strains of both philosophies.
Moreover, even within each tradition, there is much room for fashioning different
forms of exclusive rights in artistic creations.
In the United States, modern copyright law protects "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," with no requirement of
publication. 39 Copyright is the right to exclude others from reproduction, preparation
of derivative works, distribution of copies, and public performances of work, inter
alia.40 Copyright duration is 70 years after the death of the last surviving author of
a work or, in the case of works made for hire, 120 years from creation. 41 Many of
these characteristics are shared with the scope of copyrights elsewhere in the
world-often due to multilateral, regional, and bilateral treaty requirements. 42
However, as discussed below, these general contours were not always standardized,
among or within countries.
Patent law shares some of the same purposes as copyright, and like
copyright law, developed from an early field of diverse, territorial incentives to
become a more homogenous set of rights. Patents have long had a utilitarian
justification, 43 although the labor theory44 and prospect theory 45 provide alternateand sometimes complementary-justifications. Still, early patent grants were not
necessarily incentives for invention as much as they were incentives to introduce
new technologies to a country. Currently, governments encourage invention and
investment in innovation through the time-limited rights to exclude of patents.
Patent rights impose social costs-primarily, reduced access to the invention during
the term of the patent, resulting from elevated, noncompetitive pricing. Countries
implementing patent systems generally considered these costs justified, reasoning
that inventions that would not have existed but for the patent system would
otherwise not have been available at any price, and that patents, by requiring public

38.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REv. 1569, 1576-77 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual
Property, 98 VA. L. REv. 1745, 1750-52 (2012); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326-27 (1989).
39.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2018).
40.
Id. § 106.
41.
Id. § 302.
42.
See discussion infra Section IIIB.
43.
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REv. 1575, 1597-99 (2003); Fromer, supra note 38, at 1750.
44.
See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of IntellectualProperty,77 GEo. L.J.

287, 296-330 (1988).
45.
Edmund Kitch suggested that patents are prospect rights, like mineral claims,
and an inventor discloses the boundaries of her claims and manages subsequent investment,
use, and research. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 272-76 (1977).
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disclosure and limited terms, ultimately advance scientific progress.4 6 Like
copyright law, competing justifications for-and arguments about-these theories
and their application shaped the structure of early patent law.
In the United States, modern patents are exclusive rights to make, use, sell,
offer for sale, or import new, useful, and nonobvious products or processes. 47 Patent
duration is 20 years from the effective filing date of an application. 48 There are,
however, a few opportunities for extensions of the term. The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the "Hatch-Waxman Act")
allows for extensions to patent term to make up for the time it takes to obtain clinical
approval. 49 However, the baseline rule is that the patent term is 20 years. The 20year term was a change for the United States, made in order to comply with the
TRIPS Agreement. And in fact, many of the characteristics of the scope and duration
of patents have been standardized as a result of bilateral, multilateral, and regional
agreements on trade and IP.50
B. Early IP Laws: Territorial and Diverse
Early versions of copyright and patent laws had diverse characteristics.
Countries developed laws granting IP rights of different scopes, in different forms,
at different times, and for different durations, depending on their domestic interests.
Copyrights were sometimes granted to printers and sometimes seen as authors'
rights, and early versions had durations based on a fixed number of years. Patents
were not always based on invention so much as a willingness to introduce a new
type of manufacture to a particular country.
The early forms of copyright that originated in Europe were not
standardized. The need for some sort of protection against copying rose with the
introduction of the printing press, but the specifics of how countries implemented
this protection varied." Generally, printing privileges for literary works resulted
from individual petitions by authors, printers, or publishers; varied "in geographical
scope, duration, and breadth of coverage;" and could be granted by religious orders,
universities, political figures, and representatives of the Crown." Most often,
privileges were granted by a monarch.53 In fifteenth- and sixteenth-century France,
for example, privileges lasted from a typical two or three years up to ten years and
46.
See MASKUS, supra note 2, at 29 (" [IP rights] generate monopoly positions that
reduce current consumer welfare in return for providing adequate payoffs to innovation,
which then raises future consumer welfare."); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The
Inducement Standardof Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1595 (2011) (arguing that patents
are meant to induce innovations that would not have been made absent the promise of a
patent).
47.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 271 (2018).
48.
Id. § 154(a)(2).
49.
Id. § 156 (providing patent term restoration for patented products or methods
that have been subject to regulatory review).
50.
See discussion infra Section I.C.
51.
See Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the
Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-5 (1988).
52.
B. ZHORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1790-1920, at 226 (2005).

53.

Id.
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were held by authors of new books and works in translations, along with other
tangible, artistic work. 54 In England, too, it was the Crown that issued licenses to
print books in the fifteenth century, censoring critical works along the way."
As copyright evolved in different countries, the relevant requirements and
scope of the rights remained varied, though there was a shift away from publishers'
rights and towards authors' rights. 56 For example, an eighteenth-century decree in
France made copyright duration dependent on ownership. 7 Authors who kept their
privileges retained them in perpetuity, whereas once a publisher bought the
privilege, it expired after at least ten years, with a term dependent on its value. 58
Meanwhile in England, the Statute of Anne became the world's first copyright law
in 1709, granting rights to authors for a term of 14 years with the potential of
renewal. 59 Some have suggested that the term of 14 years was "a vestige of the time
when privileges were awarded as a means of encouraging printers" because that
duration allowed for training two sets of apprentices in printing.60 The United States
modeled its first federal copyright law on the Statute of Anne. 61 The 1790 statute
allowed for a copyright duration of 14 years from the date of publication, with the
option of renewal if the author was living when the first term expired. 62 Prior to the
passage of the federal law, all states except Delaware had laws granting copyright
of differing durations-some granted a 14-year term with renewal of 14 years, while
others granted a single term of anywhere from 14 to 21 years. 63
In the nineteenth century trade increased, and it became more desirable for
authors to obtain copyrights in foreign countries that had become markets for their
work (and in which unauthorized copies were being sold). Promises of reciprocity
became a feature of bilateral treaties: each country would grant authors from the
other signatory country the same rights as its own nationals received.' These

Id.
54.
55.
GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 31, at 193; Burger, supranote 51, at 4-5.
56.
Burger, supra note 51, at 5. This period also saw the beginning of the split
between civil law countries and their inclusion of moral rights with the rights granted to
authors and common law countries that generally protect economic rights and provide less
for moral rights. Id.
Khan, supra note 37.
57.
Id.
58.
8 Ann. c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
59.
60.
Herman Finkelstein, The Copyright Law A Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
1025, 1033-35, 1042 (1956); see also ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT
DURATION: DURATION, TERM EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE MAKING OF
COPYRIGHT POLICY 10 (1999).
61.
GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 31, at 193.
62.
See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BULLETIN No. 3 (REVISED),
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1782 RELATING TO
COPYRIGHT 1-21 (1973).
63.
BARD & KURLANTZICK, supra note 60, at 11.

64.
Burger, supra note 51, at 8-9. The Berne Convention requires that authors in
signatory countries receive "the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention." The Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised
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reciprocal agreements did not dictate the scope or content of rights but required
merely that they be available to foreigners, too. The result was a complicated
patchwork of rights, particularly because the treaties often had expiration dates. As
a result, a rights holder who wanted to enforce a foreign copyright would need to
work out whether a treaty existed, whether she had satisfied the requirements for a
copyright, and what the scope and content of her rights were in each relevant foreign
country. France became an early leader in international copyright law by unilaterally
granting protection under French copyright to foreigners in a move that resulted in
a number of bilateral copyright treaties. 65 France also had a strong interest in
increasing global protection for its authors because French works were heavily
pirated. These early moves towards bilateral reciprocity provided momentum that
led to the first Congress of Authors and Artists in Brussels that eventually became
the landmark multilateral agreement on copyright-the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the "Berne Convention"). 66
The history of patent law is one of granting privileges for the benefit of
domestic interests, although the specifics of those benefits varied. Patent grants
likely originated in Italy in the fourteenth century. 67 Florence granted an exclusive
monopoly for a barge with hoisting gear in 1421, and the Venetian Senate ruled in
1474 that inventors who registered their inventions with the Senate would have the
sole benefit of the invention for ten years.68 Venetian craftsmen-often
glassblowers-then spread the practice throughout Europe through emigration
conditioned on protection against local competition and guild restrictions. 69 The
German states were among the first to take up the idea, with England coming along
to grant exclusive rights in glass- and soap-making thereafter. 70 In seventeenthcentury England, patent grants were made by authority of the throne and recorded
on the patent rolls, giving the person named in the grant the exclusive right to make
and sell goods within the country. 71 The rights holder was required to practice the
patent and take apprentices, bolstering local manufacturing and availability of

at Paris on July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
French International Copyright Act, Paris (1852), PRIMARY SOURCES ON
65.
COPYRIGHT (1450-1900), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord
.php?id=record_f_1852.
66.
See LADAS, supra note 9, at 29, 71-72, 86.
67.
CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH
PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800, at 10 (1988).

Id. at 11.
68.
69.
Id. ("Emigrant Italian craftsmen, seeking protection against local competition
and guild restrictions as a condition of imparting their skills, disseminated knowledge of their
patent systems around Europe.").
70.
Id. In 1565, the first Scottish patent for salt-making was issued and in 1586,
the first Irish patent for glass-making was issued. Id.
71.
Letters patent were used for grants of other benefits in addition to exclusive
privileges over inventions. See Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American
Intellectual Property 9-10 (June 2005) (S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School),
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/obracha/dissertation/pdf/chapterl.pdf (contrasting the grant of
"letters patent" or "litterae patentes," which were "made by the king through an open official
document" and "litterae clausae," which were "sealed closed documents").
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goods. 72 The duration of a patent under this system was 14 years-or two
generations of apprenticeships. These benefits to domestic consumers and industry
were prized above the inventiveness or novelty of the goods or processes described
by the patent. 73 Early English practice also shows that patents could-and didbecome a means for rewarding political patrons rather than rewarding innovation or
increased consumer access. 74
Patents have remained more territorial than copyrights, and it took longer
for international considerations to affect domestic laws. Petra Moser explains that
in the mid-nineteenth century, "large differences in patent systems existed across
countries" and "[p]atenting abroad was prohibitively expensive and countries
discriminated heavily against foreign patentees." 75 Some countries offered no patent
protection at all for periods of time. For example, Switzerland did not grant patents
at all between 1850 and 1888.76 However, difficulties arose for foreign inventors
because publication of a new discovery by an inventor-or display at a World Fair
or other convention-would generally render that invention no longer "new" in the
eyes of any given patent office. The problems associated with exhibiting inventions
at international conventions provided some of the pressure necessary for the first
major multilateral patent treaty to come into being-the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (the "Paris Convention"). 77
There are many different ways to design systems that encourage or reward
creation. The diverse systems used by territories, states, and countries from the
fourteenth century to the nineteenth varied widely in terms of the relevant rights
holder, the granting authority, requirements for protection, and the scope and
duration of the right. However, as international trade increased and scientists and
artists had more interaction with foreign contemporaries, industries and
governments became more invested in securing their interests abroad. 78 As a result,
the piecemeal, bilateral treaties that were based on reciprocity gave way to more

72.

See, e.g., P.J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF.

Soc'y 292, 304 (1929) ("The term of apprenticeship was seven years. Fourteen years may
have been chosen as the proper duration of a patent to allow for the teaching of several
generations of apprentices."); Ramon A. Klitzke, HistoricalBackgroundof the English Patent
Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 615, 624 (1959) (describing how taking apprentices was a
condition for patent grants); MACLEOD, supra note 67, at 18.
73.
See sources cited supra note 72.
74.
See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How
PatentsBecame Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 177, 185-86 (2004);
Klitzke, supra note 72, at 632-33; Rajec, Free Trade, supra note 12, at 335 (discussing
mercantilism and its expression through early English patent law).
75.
Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from
Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs, 95 AMER. ECON. REv. 1214, 1216 (2005). The article goes
on to analyze data from two World Fairs to find that countries with patent laws tended to have
more innovation in certain industries-specifically industries that do not lend themselves to
trade secrets-than countries that do not. Id. at 1222-31.
76.
GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 31, at 102-03.
77.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
78.
See Rajec, EvaluatingFlexibility, supra note 30, at 163-69.
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elaborate, multilateral agreements in the nineteenth century-in particular, the
Berne Convention and the Paris Convention that paved the way for further
agreements.
C. The Golden Age of Harmonization: From Berne and Paris to TRIPS
The period from the late nineteenth century through the end of the twentieth
is the best demonstration of the harmonization narrative. Prior to this time, laws
were diverse and territorial; following the TRIPS Agreement, maximization and
fragmentation have reigned. But in the late nineteenth century, countriesparticularly in the Global North-became interested in and pursued protection for
the artistic and technological exports of their citizens and industries. 79 There were
numerous reasons that international protection was desirable for countries with
creative and innovative industries. Harmonization became a central justification
once there was a potential for a major, multilateral treaty that included developing
and least developed countries, and once differences in IP regimes were viewed as
barriers to trade. But it was not yet the main point of discussion when the Berne and
Paris Conventions were negotiated.80 These major developments in international IP
law came at the end of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively, through
large, multilateral treaties. 81 The Berne Convention 2 of 1886 and the Paris
Convention 3 of 1883 have now been widely adopted. The agreements represented
advancements in international IP law both through their form-as multilateral
treaties that would allow for future negotiations and changes-and through their
substance, which included requirements for the administration and grant of patents
and copyrights. Both treaties are now administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), one of the 15 specialized agencies of the United
Nations, 84 and have been revised numerous times and incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement. 85
When negotiations for more substantive reform to the IP treaties stalled in
discussions at WIPO, advocates for greater IP protection brought the negotiations to
a new organization-including IP rights in the negotiations for a revision of the

79.
See id.
80.
Even as late as 1986, the Berne Convention was perceived as "still a
Eurocentric instrument, with a number of hangers-on," and only with its incorporation in
TRIPS has it become "a truly universal instrument." SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND

BEYOND at ix
81.
82.
83.
84.
Plus World:

(2d ed. 2005).
Id.
See generally Berne Convention, supra note 64.
See generally Paris Convention, supra note 77.
Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, MultilateralAgreementsanda TRIPSThe World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), QUAKER UNITED

NATIONS OFFICE & QUAKER INT'L AFFAIRS PROGRAMME, 4-5 (TRIPS Issues Papers No. 3,

2003) (WIPO was created under the Stockholm Convention and has the status of a specialized
agency of the United Nations).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 2.
85.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATT"). 8 6 This regime-shifting
move tied IP rights protection to access to markets that were desirable to developing
countries and made it possible for the Global North to get many of the IP concessions
it sought.8 7 Those negotiations led to the WTO and its related agreements, including
the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement took up where the Berne Convention
and Paris Convention left off, including minimum standards of protection in IP law
and enforcement measures and backing up the requirements with a dispute
settlement understanding that gives the agreement teeth. As the TRIPS Agreement
was being negotiated, justifications for its extensive requirements relied on the
importance of harmonization to international trade.88
The Berne Convention and the Paris Convention were both major steps
forward in creating international standards of IP protection. The Berne Convention,
covering literary and artistic works, 89 imposes a national-treatment obligation on its
members that each member country must treat the nationals of other member
countries no less favorably than its own citizens. " Thus, a provision in a member
country's law that grants relevant protections only to its citizens and not to foreign
nationals of member countries would violate a national treatment provision. 91 The
Berne Convention also requires that members provide rights without requiring
formalities (such as registration) and lays out minimum rights that countries are
required to grant. 92
The Paris Convention 93 includes a national-treatment provision and
requires specific periods of priority for filing. The national-treatment provision
requires member countries to grant the same privileges to nationals of other member
countries 94 as they grant to their own nationals. 95 This is a reciprocity requirement,
not a requirement of minimum standards of protection. In contrast to the Berne
Convention, the Paris Convention did not include minimum standards of protection.
Under reciprocity, if a member country grants a patent term of just ten years, the

86.
See, e.g., Donald P. Harris, The Power of Ideas: The Declaration of Patent
Protection and New Approaches to InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 6 U.C.
IRVINE L. REv. 343, 378 (2016) (discussing regime-shifting in intellectual property law).
See generally Laurence Helfer, Regime-Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and
87.
the New Dynamics of IntellectualPropertyPolicymaking, 29 YALE J. INT. L. 1 (2004).
88.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
89.
The Berne Convention does not apply to "neighboring rights," which AngloAmerican law generally includes in its copyright definition but which civil law countries
distinguish from "authors' rights." See Berne Convention, supra note 64, art. 2, 5.
See id.
90.
91.
See, e.g., Joined Cases C-92/92 & C-326/92, Phil Collins v. Imtrat
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1993 E.C.R. I-5145 (finding violation of EU national treatment art
public performance rights).
92.
See Charles R. McManis, IntellectualPropertyand InternationalMergers and
Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1287 (1998).
93.
Paris Convention, supra note 77, art. 2-4; see also GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE,
supra note 31, at 428.
94.
The provision also applies to persons domiciled in a member country or who
have industrial or commercial establishments in a member country. Paris Convention, supra
note 77, art. 3.
Id. art. 2.
95.
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Paris Convention requires only that foreigners who are nationals of member
countries be granted the same term, on the same conditions as citizens. National
treatment is less of an imposition on domestic lawmaking than minimum standards,
but it still can affect domestic laws. For example, it would have prohibited a shortlived "domestic working" provision in early American patent law that required
foreigners to practice their patents within the country in order to maintain a U.S.
patent, whereas U.S. citizens had no such obligation.9 6 The provision relating to
priority drove the negotiations of the Paris Convention, which was in part spurred
by inventors' concerns about presenting their work internationally. 97 Inventors were
rightly concerned that a public presentation would count as "public use" in a
country, which would then render the invention no longer "new" and therefore
ineligible for patent protection. But countries benefit from scientific exchanges, and
inventors may not always have time or resources to file in every country to which
they travel. The Paris Convention therefore provides that filing for a patent in one
member country preserves that filing date in other countries for 12 months. 98
The national treatment and priority dates prescribed by the Paris
Convention do not require harmonization of substantive laws as they are substanceneutral provisions. 99 Measures aimed at substantive harmonization in patent law
came later. Still, procedural harmonization received another big boost with the
Patent Cooperation Treaty (the "PCT"), which entered into force on January 24,
1978.100 The PCT simplifies the filing process for inventors who are interested in
procuring patents in multiple countries. 101 The PCT is not substantive, except, of
course, that questions of procedure and entitlement to file or receive a patent greatly
affect the substance of any patent holder's rights.
The TRIPS Agreement continued the momentum of prior multilateral IP
agreements. It focused more heavily on substantive law and enforcement
mechanisms than prior treaties. 102 However, TRIPS is an annex to the Uruguay
Round Agreement forming the WTO. The lowered trade barriers that followed the

96.
See, e.g., Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908)
(noting the brief period in which a working requirement was enacted for foreign patentees).
GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 31, at 428 (explaining that the need for
97.
international protections became apparent when "several foreign firms decided not to
participate [in an 1873 international exhibition of inventions in Vienna] out of concern that
by exhibiting their inventions they would jeopardize protection for them").
98.
Paris Convention, supra note 77, art. 4.C. The Convention also provided a
priority period of six months for industrial designs and trademarks. Id.
99.
Frederick M. Abbott, IntellectualProperty, InternationalProtection, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw

1 21 (2010) ("The

Paris Convention

does not define a patent or what criteria are used for granting it. It does not prescribe subjectmatter coverage, it does not set a minimum-or maximum-term of a patent, it does not
define the rights of patent holders, and it was perceived as having a weak dispute settlement
mechanism.").
100.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
101.
See Gladstone, supra note 2 ("The PCT permits a citizen of any member nation
to submit a patent application for review and to designate the nations where he would later
seek to obtain a national patent. This treaty enables a single application to be transferred and
registered with a number of countries for later examination and national patent grant.").
102.
See Rajec, EvaluatingFlexibility, supra note 30, at 166-70.
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GATT had led to increased transnational production and the formation of many
multinational enterprises. 103 The WTO agreement was constrained and harmonized
trading practices among nations to further reduce barriers, thus allowing the free
flow of goods across borders. 104 In this context, harmonizing IP laws was an
important way to lower barriers to trade, resulting in lower costs to global companies
that exist across and move between legal regimes. 105 The harmonization language
makes sense both because it justified the inclusion of IP rights in a trade agreement
and because it mirrored the European efforts at harmonization at the time. The EU
was harmonizing its laws to form a common market. This effort included the
harmonization of IP laws 0 6 through a series of directives. 107 The language of
harmonization is therefore very much tied up in the decision to negotiate the TRIPS
Agreement as part of a large, multilateral trade agreement rather than a separate IP
treaty through WIPO. It is also worth emphasizing that, at the same time the WTO
was being formed, smaller, regional trade agreements also began to play a strong
role in shaping IP rights. As mentioned above, the EU was formed in 1993, building
on the European Economic Community and bringing into effect much more
sweeping, and true, harmonization of laws to form a single trading market. In the
Americas, too, increased trade led to the formation of a trading bloc in the form of
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). NAFTA also included
provisions about IP rights. 108 While IP was important to countries, trade interests
were the driving force behind much of the international cooperation at the time.
The TRIPS Agreement has been described as a harmonizing agreement and
justified as such-as have a number of the treaties following the TRIPS
Agreement. 109 Examples of this harmonization in TRIPS span procedural and
substantive provisions of copyright and patent law.110 One view of the
harmonization argument is that countries with strong IP protection (developed
103.

Id. at 166.

104.

See CHARAN DEVEREAUX ET AL., CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE NEGOTIATION 2

(Inst. for Int'l Econs. ed., 2006).
105.
Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of InternationalIntellectual Property Law
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 983 (2014).
106.
Jan Corbet, The Law of the EEC and Intellectual Property, 13 J. L. & COMM.
328-36 (1994), reprinted in GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 31, at 162-79.
107.
See, e.g., Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 Nov. 1992 on Rental Right and
Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual
Property, 1992 O.J. (L 346/61) (EC); 1994 GRUR Int. 141, 1994 O.J. (L 290/12) (EC) (24
November 1993) (addressing duration of copyright term and related rights); Directive
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr. 2004 on the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195/16) (addressing enforcement
of rights); Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec.
2006 on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 2006 O.J. (L
372/12).
108.
NAFTA, supra note 23, at ch. 17.
109.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
110.
For example, the TRIPS Agreement includes substantive patent provisions
through subject matter requirements for patent protection and does not allow for laws that
discriminate based on the subject matter of inventions. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art.
27. Similarly, the TRIPS Agreement requires that computer programs be protected under
copyright. Id. art. 10.
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countries) created positive externalities (innovation) for countries with lower IP
protection, and these countries were "free riding" on the information produced in
the developed countries."1 This view assumes that producers in developed countries
are undercompensated, though it is unspecific as to whether the under compensation
is based on notions of moral entitlement or an argument that worldwide protection
and the resulting compensation is necessary to encourage an ideal level of
creation. 2 The question of whether inventors and creators are entitled to internalize
all the benefits produced by their activities, such that any actor benefiting from those
activities is a "free rider," is not just an international IP question. It is also relevant
to any debate about the appropriate levels of IP protection.311 This is because the
insight that creation and innovation create positive externalities is true domestically
and globally-and the insight shows nothing about the ideal level of compensation
for creators and innovators.
Another view simply casts differences in levels of IP protection as barriers
to efficient trade that are undesirable because they lower social welfare globally.
Modern international trade law aims to lower trade barriers and encourage
competition in order to increase global welfare.11 4 Lowering trade barriers allows
for specialization in countries that can lead to the scaling of industries in ways that
achieve greater efficiency." 5 Tariffs are one example of barriers to trade that reduce
global social welfare by artificially inflating the prices of goods from abroad. The
GATT, predecessor to the WTO Agreement, had the purpose of reducing "tariffs
and other trade barriers and . . . the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and
mutually advantageous basis." 1 1 6 The agreement resulted in tariff reductions1 17 and
led to negotiations to establish the WTO and associated agreements as a way to
reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade to enhance global welfare. 118
Yet another justification for the stringent measures required by the TRIPS
Agreement focuses on the potential benefits to developing countries, suggesting that
harmonization would not only lower barriers to trade but also would benefit

111.
E.g., John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 695-96 (2002).
112.
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
113.
See id.
114.
Rajec, Free Trade, supra note 12, at 328.
115.
See, e.g., KRUGMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 24.
116.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, pmbl. 1.
117.
See Douglas A. Irwin, International Trade Agreements, in THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS

298 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008), http://www.econlib.org

/library/Enc/InternationalTradeAgreements.html (explaining that the "annual gain from
removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade as a result of the Uruguay Round
Agreement ... has been put at about $96 billion, or 0.4 percent of world GDP").
118.
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 10, pmbl. (stating desire of members to
substantially reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade in order to raise standards of living and
employment levels, expand the production of and trade in goods and services, and allow for
optimal use of world resources).
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developing and developed countries by increasing foreign direct investment. 119 The
rationale behind this idea was that technology-intensive industries were more likely
to invest in countries with stronger IP protection because they would not fear theft
of their technology. Developing countries and least developed countries were not
swayed by this argument, as other pressure was needed to secure their agreement. 1 2 0
Regardless of its effectiveness at achieving the goals of investment and technology
transfer, the stated goals are included in the TRIPS Agreement text. 1 2 1
Ultimately, a drive to harmonize IP laws was frequently cited but was not
the only motivating factor for any of the participants in the WTO negotiations. 1 2 2
Protection of IP abroad is valuable to IP-intensive industries in developed countries.
Developing and least developed countries had reason to object to the requirements
for creating strong IP regimes that may not have fit their human rights or
development agendas. However, because the TRIPS Agreement was linked to trade,
concessions relating to IP were worthwhile for countries that sought unrelated
trading benefits in other industries, such as textiles. 12 In addition to the "carrots" of
opening markets, there were "sticks" that drove developing countries to make
concessions on IP rights in order to avoid placement on the United States Trade
Representative's Special 301 report. 124 Harmonization-or harmony-may "carr[y]
a positive charge," 125 but there are reasons to be wary of it. Not least of all are the
ways that the relevant agreements, from Berne and Paris to TRIPS, have failed to
impose it.

II. THE HARMONIZATION MYTH
Globally, IP laws appear more harmonized than 500 years ago because they
are-in procedure, form, and even substance. Differences remain, such as the

119.
Kaminski, supra note 105, at 983-84 ("The creation of a global floor for IP
protection has also been argued to incentivize IP-intensive companies to export and invest
abroad.").
120.
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
121.
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement listing objectives of the agreement includes
the importance of technology transfer and dissemination. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11,
art. 7 ("The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology,
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.").
122.
Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility, supra note 30, at 168 ("Although the
negotiations and resulting agreement evidenced a strong tide toward harmonization and
increased intellectual property rights worldwide, there were other undercurrents to the
story.").
123.
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION
OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 32

(2012) (explaining that the TRIPS Agreement was an intellectual property "tax" on
developing countries that allowed them to do business in other sectors).
124.
HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 39-40 (2007) (describing the United States' withdrawal of certain
trade benefits and its threats of trade sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act in
retaliation against countries that refused to grant certain patent rights).
125.
BARD & KURLANTZICK, supra note 60, at 193.
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variations in rules of ownership, 1 2 6 existence of moral rights, 12 7 and application of
legal standards. 1 28 However, the view of harmonization as a general goal of
international IP negotiations, with occasional deviations when needed for public
health or other reasons, persists. 1 2 9 But developments in the years since the TRIPS
Agreement came into force show that harmonization is not the best explanation for
the development of international IP law.
The better explanation is maximization. The TRIPS Agreement was
notable because it required countries to meet certain minimum standards of IP
protection.130 However, upon conclusion of the agreement, interest groups and
member countries immediately stepped up efforts to tailor protection.1 3 1 For
developed countries with strong creative or innovative industries-the Global
North-this meant strategic moves to increase protection through forum-shifting
and bilateral or regional trade agreements. 13 2 It is an effort that has continued to the
most recent regional trade agreement negotiations. At the same time, developing
countries and scholars concerned about access to medicine and other potential
problems associated with high levels of IP protection began exploring
interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement that allowed for more flexibility in the
agreement's implementation.1 33 Least developed countries joined some of these

&

126.
Intellectual property ownership is affected by property law, which is generally
considered territorial and rarely addressed by intellectual property treaties between countries.
Even so, inheritance, labor, and contract laws interact with choice of law rules, rendering
ownership a central and variable part of understanding global intellectual property rights. One
example is how countries vary in their default rules about intellectual property ownership of
works made for hire. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153
F.3d 82, 84, 88-92 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying choice of law rules and looking to Russian law
to determine the ownership of U.S. copyright over works created for hire in Russia).
127.
Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEX. A&M L. REv. 873, 874-76 (2014)
(summarizing the history and differences between moral rights in Anglo-American copyright
and continental copyright regimes).
128.
For example, while the TRIPS Agreement includes a requirement that
countries grant patents to inventions that are new, useful, and non-obvious, standards for nonobviousness differ globally. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27.1. See
generally Amy Nelson, Obviousness or Inventive Step as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules:
A Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004) (providing a comparative study of
obviousness standards in patent law).
129.
See discussion supra Part I.
130.
See discussion supra Section I.C.
131.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
132.
Intellectual property reliant industries have also pursued forum shifting IP
maximization through investment treaty arbitration. These strategies are generally beyond the
scope of this project, although they are likely to increase. See generally Brook K. Baker
Katrina Geddes, The Incredible Shrinking Victory: Eli Lilly v. Canada, Success, Judicial
Reversal, and Continuing Threats from PharmaceuticalISDS, 49 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 479
(2017) (discussing the investor-state dispute settlement process in Eli Lilly's challenge to
Canada's amendments to its patent law).
133.
The 2001 Ministerial Declaration at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha
is one example of attempts to clarify that exceptions incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement
were meant to allow for countries to address public health problems within their countries.
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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interpretive efforts but have also sought to extend the period of transition, thereby
postponing the date on which they need to comply with the minimum
requirements.13 4 But ultimately, the developed countries have been more successful
in increasing global IP protection. This is because various provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement are geared towards maximization. There was a flurry of post-TRIPS
treaties, termed TRIPS-plus by many, that resulted in new-and higher-minimum
standards of IP protection that were pushed on developing countries piecemeal,
rather than going through the onerous and difficult processes established for
amending the TRIPS Agreement.135 While this trend runs counter to the stated
harmonizing purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, it is enabled by TRIPS provisions.
This Part discusses how the TRIPS Agreement and other treaties allow for
disharmonization only for changes that increase IP rights protection and describes
the proliferation of IP treaties, following the TRIPS Agreement, that increase levels
of IP protection.
A. IP Treaty Provisions: Tools of Maximization, Not Harmonization
The TRIPS Agreement, like the Berne Convention, requires members to
grant certain minimum rights; it does not require all members to grant the same
rights. 136 The TRIPS Agreement had a strong harmonizing effect as countries with
diverse IP laws made changes to meet those minimum standards; but by including
no ceiling, TRIPS left room for future disharmony. Member countries must comply
with the TRIPS requirements but are left free to provide stronger levels of
protection. Once bilateral agreements increase the minimum standards of IP
protection, for example, those new levels are often included in future bilateral
agreements, eventually making their way into regional agreements.13 7 Moreover, in

134.
The TRIPS Agreement included a ten-year grace period for least developed
countries that has been extended twice. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 24. Most
recently, a 2013 Decision of the Council for TRIPS extended the transition period under
Article 66.1 until July 2021 or when a country moves out of least developed country status,
whichever is earlier. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Extension of the TransitionPeriodUnderArticle 66.1 for Least Developed CountryMembers,
WTO Doc. IP/C/64 (June 12, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/tadocs_e
/7_1_ipc64_e.pdf.
135.
See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global
Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 77-78 (1997)
(explaining that further increases to the IP protection requirements in TRIPS would run
against the interests of developing and least developed countries).
136.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 12 (describing minimum term for
copyright), art. 33 (describing minimum patent term).
137.
Graeme Dinwoodie discusses how powerful countries, such as the United
States, can trade commitments to increased IP protection for foreign aid in bilateral
negotiations and those commitments will then proliferate without political accountability or
multilateral agreement. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An
(Inter)nationalistPerspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 355, 390-91
(2007) (" [I]t is not difficult for the United States to secure an agreement with a single country
regarding a slew of copyright commitments, and such bilateral obligations are effectively
made multilateral through the mechanism of the most favored nation provision of the TRIPS
Agreement. Such a lawmaking mechanism contains close to no political checks at the
international level.").
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copyright laws, a provision found in the various multilateral treaties grant exceptions
to national treatment. The remnant of reciprocity rules from earlier treaties,
embodied as the rule of the shorter term, provides even more incentive to countries
to increase copyright duration, forming the "one-way ratchet" that leads to everincreasing copyright terms.
The various international treaties that are justified as tools of harmonization
all have set floors, not ceilings, with regard to term. The Berne Convention, for
example, provides in general that its provisions "shall not preclude the making of a
claim to the benefit of any greater protection which may be granted by legislation in
a country of the Union"13 8 and allows member countries entering into agreements to
grant more extensive rights than those provided by the convention. 139 As for term,
the Berne Convention provides a term of the author's life of plus 50 years, with a
term of 25 years from creation for photographic works and works of applied art.140
These are floors, and the convention provides that members "may grant a term of
protection in excess of those provided by the preceding paragraphs." 141
National-treatment provisions have been a part of copyright treaties since
the Berne Convention, though they are also a staple of trade-related treaties as well.
National treatment requires that each member country treat the nationals of other
member countries no less favorably than its own citizens. A provision in a member
country's law that grants IP protections to its citizens and not to citizens of member
countries violates national treatment. 142 However, the Berne Convention provided
for an exception to national treatment that has resulted in pressure on countries to
increase their terms of copyright protection. This provision, known as "the rule of
the shorter term," provides that copyright term will be governed by the law where
the copyright is claimed, except that "the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the
country of origin of the work." 1 43 This provision is a glaring exception to national
treatment, providing a default rule that works of foreign origin will receive the
shorter of terms, not necessarily the full term as provided to works of domestic
origin. At first blush, by potentially granting shorter terms to works of foreign origin,
the provision may be copyright minimizing-after all, it is a rule of shorter term.
However, as discussed below, the effect of the provision has proven to be
maximizing.144
The Paris Convention did not impose minimum standards of protection like
the Berne Convention did. While the Paris Convention required national treatment
with respect to patent protection, 145 it did not dictate a minimum term of protection
and therefore allowed countries a fair amount of flexibility. As a result, member
countries needed only to extend the same protection to nationals of other member

138.
Berne Convention, supra note 64, art. 19.
139.
Id. art. 20.
140.
Id. art. 7.
141.
Id. para. 6.
142.
Joined Cases C-92/92 & C-326/92, Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft
mbH, 1993 E.C.R. I-5145.
143.
Berne Convention, supra note 64, art. 7, para. 8.
144.
See discussion infra Part III.
145.
Paris Convention, supra note 77, art. 2.
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countries as they granted to their own members. 14 6 The important temporal provision
in that agreement-the requirement of a one-year priority period-was precise and
did not allow for longer grace periods for patent filings. The convention allows
anyone who files a patent application in any member country a one-year period of
time in which to file in other member countries while still referencing the first filing
date for purposes of showing an invention to be new and nonobvious. 147 The
practical effect of this was that the invention need only be new as of the earliest
filing date, and inventors did not need to have a strategy of simultaneous filing in all
countries to ward off claims that their filings elsewhere were disclosures that
rendered the same invention unpatentable. However, the provision demonstrates
something else: countries are perfectly capable of agreeing to precise time periods
when a single rule appears to be the most efficient way of governing international
patent interests. Still, it was not until the TRIPS Agreement that stringent,
substantive patent law requirements were agreed to in a multilateral treaty. But when
they were, it was again in terms of minimum rights, with an open-ended ceiling.
The TRIPS Agreement sets out the minimum protections members must
grant. 148 Indeed, before any specific requirements are laid out, the first article to the
agreement provides, "[m]embers may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their
law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement." 14 9 Throughout
the agreement, then, all of the requirements provide floors, but not ceilings, on what
rights countries must grant to those seeking IP rights. The TRIPS Agreement
imposes a minimum copyright term of life plus 50 years15 0 and in the case of works
without flesh-and-blood authors, a required minimum term of 50 years. 15 1
While incorporation of the Berne Convention's minimum term and
inclusion of other works had the potential to harmonize copyright term, the EU
15
countries were already working on an extension of term.2
In the years since TRIPS,
the law of copyright term has therefore become disharmonized.15 3 Similarly, the
term of protection for performers and producers of phonograms was required to last
"at least until the end of a period of 50 years" from the end of the year of creation.15 4
146.
147.

Id.
Id. art. 4.

148.
WORLD TRADE ORG., A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT 13
(Antony Taubman, Hannu Wager & Jayashree Watal eds., 2012) ("[T]he TRIPS Agreement
sets out minimum standards of protection to be provided by each Member. Article 1.1 makes
it clear that Members may, but are not obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection than required by the Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene
its provisions. For example, Members may provide for longer terms of protection than that
mandated by the TRIPS Agreement but they are not required to do so.").
149.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.
150.
The TRIPS Agreement requires compliance with the minimum standards of
the 1971 revision of the Berne Convention. Id. art. 9(1) (although the TRIPS Agreement
provides an exception for the moral rights in the Berne Convention's Article 6bis). Thus, the
Berne Convention requirement of life plus fifty is also required by the TRIPS Agreement.
Berne Convention, supra note 64, art. 7(1).
151.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 12.
152.
See discussion infra Section IIIB.
153.
Id.
154.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 14.5.
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In contrast, for member countries that seek to implement exceptions to the required
protection, the TRIPS Agreement specifies that such exceptions should "confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the right holder." 15 5 Thus, while members are free to
deviate upward in levels of protection, without limit, downward deviations are
carefully constrained.
Patent rights are similarly open-ended. While minimum levels of protection
are required, member countries may deviate upwards from those standards, even if
the deviation results in disharmony among countries. The TRIPS Agreement
provides that the term of patent protection "shall not end before the expiration of a
period of twenty years" from the filing date, but it does not give any limit on how
long a patent term can last. 156 While member countries have adhered to the 20-year
term contemplated as a minimum, other means of extending patent terms exist and
have become more common in the years since the TRIPS Agreement was
negotiated.15 7 As with copyright, members seeking to implement exceptions are
constrained. The TRIPS Agreement provides that members may implement "limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties." 158 The other permitted exceptions
require that certain conditions be met in order to allow exceptions for certain subject
0
matter 159 or in the case of compulsory licenses for public health needs. 1 6
The problem is not just that the TRIPS Agreement provides floors and not
ceilings for IP rights. There are other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that work
against harmonization or uniformity. It is worth noting that although harmonization
was used as a justification for the agreement, it is not included as an objectiverather, the objectives are "protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights"
in order to "contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology." 161
One example of the TRIPS Agreement ignoring harmonization is that it
explicitly leaves out the issue of the exhaustion of IP rights-a question that is
central to cross-border trade in goods subject to IP rights. 162 Many countries have
rules of domestic exhaustion, providing that the first authorized sale of goods subject
to patents or copyright exhaust those rights. As a result, a patent holder cannot, for
example, sue the purchaser of a used car for patent infringement. The first sale of
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 33.
See discussion infra Section IIIC.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 30.

159.
Id. art. 27.2-27.3 (exceptions include if prevention "is necessary to protect
ordrepublic or morality," as well as diagnostic methods of treatment).
160.
Id. art. 31.
161.
Id. art. 7.
162.
Id. art. 6 ("[N]othing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights"). For a discussion of how an international rule
of exhaustion would lower barriers to trade, see Rajec, Free Trade, supra note 12.
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the car to an authorized buyer exhausts the patent holder's rights and the purchaser
can use and resell the car without engaging in infringement. The rule of exhaustion
allows for a robust resale market and for consumer autonomy in the use and
disposition of chattel. However, when the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated, the
United States, European countries, and others did not have a rule of international
exhaustion. As a result, rights holders who had patents in multiple countries could
sue to stop the importation of goods lawfully purchased abroad, thereby engaging in
geographic price discrimination and providing a barrier to trade.
Although harmonization of an international exhaustion rule would have
lowered a significant barrier to trade in goods subject to IP rights, countries in the
Global North were unwilling to sign on. The United States has since adopted rules
of international exhaustion for patents 1 63 and copyrights,1" unilaterally and through
Supreme Court opinions rather than legislative initiative.
In contrast, the EU maintains a rule of exhaustion only within the common
market, allowing rights holders to stop the importation of goods lawfully purchased
abroad. The inability to agree to implement-or revisit-a rule of international
exhaustion demonstrates how countries in the Global North were able to hedge on
some aspects of harmonization that did not fit domestic interests.
The TRIPS Agreement also maintains the permissive stance towards the
rule of the shorter term from the Berne Convention. This provision undercuts
national treatment by treating works of foreign origin differently from those of
domestic origin. Moreover, its effect undercuts harmonization. On its face, perhaps,
the rule minimizes the length of copyright protection, correspondingly hastening the
entry of works into the public domain. From this perspective, it is not a maximizing
provision. However, the effect of the rule of the shorter term is to put pressure on
countries to increase copyright term so that domestic authors are not at a
disadvantage in foreign markets. 1 65 As discussed below, this is precisely the effect
the rule had on the United States when the EU implemented a longer copyright term
166
together with a rule of the shorter term.
As a result of the TRIPS Agreement merely setting floors on rights
requirements, along with other provisions that allow for ever-increasing levels of
protection, some have critiqued the TRIPS Agreement for failure to achieve long-

163.
See, e.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1563
(2017).
164.
See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1352 (2013).
165.
Edward Lee, Copyright, Death, and Taxes, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 15
(2012) ("The rule of the shorter term thus puts pressure on countries to increase their
copyright terms to whatever is the longest term of copyright recognized by a Berne country.").
166.
See discussion infra Section IIIB.
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term stability of patent rights 16 7 and for allowing changes and escalations in
copyright protection. 168
B. The Proliferation of Trade and Investment Treaties Following the TRIPS
Agreement
The IP laws of the past 25 years have been more harmonized in procedure
and substance than at any time since their emergence some 500 years ago. However,
in ways that were merely apparent earlier but inescapable now, the treaties that made
this harmonization possible have also left significant room for disharmony in IP law
protections.169 In particular, the treaties have left room for countries to increase the
protections they offer, individually and without regard to whether other countries
pursue such changes. 17 0 As a result, through a proliferation of bilateral investment
and trade treaties as well as regional and other multilateral treaties, standards of IP
protection have fragmented, albeit within the boundaries allowed by the TRIPS
Agreement. Many countries have agreed to increased minimum standards of
protection, moving themselves out of harmony with those countries that continue to
implement the TRIPS minimum standards.
The ever-increasing levels of IP protection, labelled as an "upward ratchet"
by Susan Sell, trace to the years after the TRIPS Agreement. 171 Developed countries
with IP-dependent industries, such as the United States, often see trade agreements
as an opportunity to "export" their law, or ask foreign countries to harmonize to
them, rather than as an opportunity to negotiate and compromise. 1 72 Almost
immediately after the TRIPS Agreement was signed, the United States and others
began negotiating new bilateral and multilateral treaties that increased IP protection.
Ruth Okediji suggests that developing countries had hoped the TRIPS Agreement
would diminish the use of bilateralism to achieve stronger IP protection; this did not
happen. 173 Instead, countries that are net exporters-particularly the United Stateshave included robust IP chapters in many of their trade agreements, whereas
167.
See, e.g., Mohammed K. El-Said, Trips-Plus,Public Health and PerformanceBased Rewards Schemes Options and Supplements for Policy Formation in Developing and
Least Developed Countries, 31 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 373, 408 (2016) (arguing that "TRIPS
failed to achieve stability in the global regulation of intellectual property rights" because it
allows for higher levels of protection).
168.
See Eric Schwartz, Session II: The Impact ofInternationalCopyright Treaties
and Trade Agreements on the Development of Domestic Norms, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 339,
339 (2017) ("International copyright is an interlocking set of national laws for which the
treaties set norms-often floors (minimum levels of protection)."). See generally SELL, supra
note 25.
169.
See discussion supra Section IIA.
170.
Id.
171.
See, e.g., SELL, supra note 25 ("Ever since the WTO TRIPS negotiations that
ended in 1994, [IP maximalists] have been using every opportunity to increase intellectual
property protection and enforcement beyond TRIPS. They have been relentless, focused, and
have devoted untold resources to their quest for higher global standards of intellectual
property protection and enforcement.").
172.
Kaminski, supranote 105, at 991.
173.
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in
InternationalIntellectual PropertyProtection, 1 U. OTTOWA L. TECH. J. 127, 140-41 (2004)
(noting post-TRIPS bilateralism as a means of forum-shifting).
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countries that are net importers generally have not. 17 4 Rochelle Dreyfuss has shown
how each treaty, whether bilateral, multilateral, or megaregional, 175 can then serve
as a template for future treaties in ways that increase protection and constrain
countries from exploring the flexibilities that are still currently available. 1 76 Even
countries that do not join new treaties "find themselves operating in a new legal
landscape," Dreyfuss explains, because the effects of these agreements extend
beyond the domestic domain of the member countries. 177
Many of the bilateral trade agreements that the United States concluded
with trading partners following the TRIPS Agreement included IP provisions. The
free-trade agreement between Korea and the United States is one example of how
bilateral treaties can be used to introduce new, higher levels of IP that are then likely
to be included in future regional agreements. 17 8 The EU also began negotiating with
trading partners and entering into a number of agreements that included IP and
TRIPS-plus provisions. 17 9 More recently, a push towards regional or megaregional
agreements has allowed for another round of increases to minimum standards of
protection. These result in disharmony between the countries that are entering the
regional agreements and countries that maintain the TRIPS Agreement minimum
standards that were once considered so high. The next Part takes up these
agreements and traces the way that term of protection has been increased-and
disharmonized-in the past quarter century.
III. THE MAXIMIZATION REALITY
The proliferation of bilateral and multilateral treaties following the TRIPS
Agreement reflects an agenda of rights maximization. Countries engaged in treaty
negotiation have abandoned harmonizing measures in favor of maximizing
measures in a number of circumstances. One such area is in IP rights duration. Even
as the TRIPS Agreement was under negotiation, the EU was negotiating a directive
that would require a term of IP rights to last 20 years longer than the duration
required by the Berne Convention, which was ultimately incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement. The duration of IP rights protection is a useful lens through

174.
Peter Drahos, Weaving Webs of Influence: The United States, Free Trade
Agreements and Dispute Resolution, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 196-97 (2007).
175.
This refers to agreements such as the now-defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership,
which, with the withdrawal of the United States, has become the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The original negotiating group
included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. See sources cited supra note 23.
176.
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Harmonization: Top Down, Bottom Up And Now
Sideways? The Impact of the IP Provisions of MegaregionalAgreements on Third Party
States 15 (Inst. For Int'l Law & Justice, Working Paper 2017/2, 2018), https://www.iilj.org
/publications/harmonization-top-bottom-now-sideways-impact-ip-provisions-megaregionalagreements-third-party-states/ (explaining that bilateral agreements such as the Korea-US
FTA were a template for the TPP, which could then serve as a template for future agreements).
177.
Id. at 3.
178.
See Schwartz, supra note 168, at 342 (referring to the U.S. Korea FTA as a
"high water mark" of bilateral agreements with respect to intellectual property protection and
describing the various IP-increasing measures contained therein).
179.
See discussion infra Part III.
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which to examine competing narratives of harmonization and maximization. Earlier
Sections have shown the diversity of terms among countries during the early
development of IP law. This Part focuses on term length requirements in order to
explore and understand international IP governance. This Part explains the role of
rights duration in IP protection and then traces the inclusion of term-extension
measures in post-TRIPS treaty-making. These measures systematically eschew
harmonization for diversity and maximization.
A. The Role of Duration in IP Rights Protection
IP rights are typically of limited duration-in the United States, this
characteristic is imposed by the constitutional provision authorizing Congress to
craft rights in science and the useful arts. 180 The benefits of limiting the term of a
copyright or a patent include the assurance that as the store of knowledge grows,
future inventors and creators will not forever be bound by myriad, overlapping rights
granted to prior generations of inventors and creators. Further, the public domain
will grow as works lose their protection and become available as building blocks for
future creative and innovative works.
Term is at once deeply important to the substance of global IP rights and
fairly neutral as to that substance. 181 That is because longer terms correlate with
greater rewards to IP rights holders, whereas shorter terms correlate with earlier
entrance into the public domain. At the same time, calculating the term of a right is
generally straightforward and not based on the substance of the underlying work. In
the case of copyright, term traditionally commences on the date of publication of a
work, whereas expiration is based either on the year in which the author died or the
year of publication. For patents, term expiration is now uniformly based on the date
an application is filed, which is available on the face of an issued patent and therefore
fairly easy to calculate.
The "ideal" term of protection for IP rights is the subject of empirical and
normative debate within and among countries. 182 It is uniformly applied in patent
and copyright, respectively, and as such, contributes to uniformity costs, which
Michael Carroll has argued are the central problem of IP laws. 183 He explains that
"perfectly tailored rights that promise innovators only the expected value required
to induce socially desirable innovation would be theoretically optimal," but IP laws
fall short for reasons including "uncertainty about innovation, information
180.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ") (emphasis
added).
181.
For an article suggesting that term and substance should be explicitly linked,
see Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REv. 409, 410 (2002)
(" [T]his Article argues that the older a copyrighted work is, the greater the scope of fair use
should be-that is, the greater the ability of others to re-use, critique, transform, and adapt
the copyrighted work without permission of the copyright owner.").
182.
See generally Tyler Ochoa, Limits on the Durationof Copyright: Theories and
Practice, in TIME: LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS

(Jo Alyson Parker et al.

eds., 2010),

https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1803&context=facpubs.
183.
See generally Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity
Cost in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 845 (2006).
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asymmetries between policymakers and innovators, administrative costs of
tailoring," and political economy considerations. 184 Thus, it would be ideal to tailor
term to fit different genres of creation, fields of technologies, and perhaps, even
individual creations or inventions. It is far from clear that the current duration of IP
rights is ideal-longer, shorter, infinite, or no duration might all result in the
production of the "correct" amount of innovation or art. However, as far as IP rights
go, terms are fairly easy characteristics to harmonize. There does not appear to be a
well-founded reason to choose 20 years as a term for all patents. This might,
therefore, be an area in which some empirical evaluation would be helpful if there
were different patent terms in different countries. However, for much the same
reasons that a minimum copyright term has been attractive to many countries with
developed creative industries, patent term is also subject to minimum standards for
term in the TRIPS Agreement. 185 Between the requirement that countries make
patents available regardless of the field of technology and the requirement of a term
length of no less than 20 years, the TRIPS Agreement seemingly harmonizes patent
term across countries. The arguments in favor of patent term harmonization
generally track those of harmonizing patent law. Thus, developed country industries
included the 20-year term when seeking protection abroad with the promise of
increasing foreign direct investment and exportation of the tacit knowledge
necessary to manufacture patented goods. 186
Term is also a useful measure of the value of harmonization in international
IP, precisely because it is easy to measure. It is, in a sense, an on-off switch. During
the term of a copyright or patent, the rights holder can exclude others from the
market; once the term has run, she cannot. This means that if one country offers a
longer term than another, goods that infringe in one country will not infringe in
another. And the information costs associated with figuring out the term of
protection of works in different countries can be quite high when those terms
differ. 18 7 This raises precisely the type of non-tariff barrier that the TRIPS
Agreement-and the general push to harmonize-decry. Therefore, it would make
sense if the Global North, having wrested agreement regarding term from the rest of
the world, maintained that uniform, harmonized term. Otherwise, the disparate terms
of protection might form such a non-tariff barrier to trade that would result in
inefficiencies. And yet, term increases have become part of many of the treaties
negotiated since the TRIPS Agreement.
B. Term Extensions in Copyright
The United States has changed the terms of IP rights to comply with
international treaties. Following the TRIPS Agreement, the United States has also
sought to conclude a series of bilateral and regional treaties that required copyright

184.
Id. at 848.
185.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 33.
186.
See Peter Lee, Transcendingthe Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
OrganizationalIntegration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REv. 1503, 1526 (2012).
187.
That is, issues related to determining copyright terms when the country of
origin or publication is not the same country in which protection is sought. See, e,g.,
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 27, 1978, 10 INT'L REV. OF INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (358), 1979 (Ger.).
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term extensions, moving from the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement
minimum up to the life plus 70 term of the EU countries. As discussed above, the
United States amended its copyright term in large part because of the EU Directive
extending term coupled with its rule of the shorter term. Together, these provisions
disadvantaged American authors and producers in European markets. Although the
United States does not have a rule of the shorter term, the term extensions have
become a part of many of the regional trade agreements concluded by the United
States in the years since its own copyright term extension.
The United States-originally a scofflaw when it came to copyright
protection-has gradually become one of the strongest proponents of copyrights and
their enforcement worldwide. In the United States, a 1790 statute provided copyright
terms of 28 years total (14 years, renewable for 14 more). 188 The terms and allowable
extensions were increased various times thereafter. 189 These extensions were in part
a reaction to extensions in copyright terms abroad. 190 In 1976, the United States
moved to a system that tied copyright term to the life of authors, providing a term
of 50 years from the author's death for works created by natural persons and 75
years from publication for other works, such as works made for hire. 191 The United
States only joined the Berne Convention in 1989.192 The TRIPS Agreement imposes
a minimum copyright term of life plus 50 years 193 and in the case of works without
flesh-and-blood authors, a required minimum term of 50 years. 194 Joining the Berne
Convention therefore did not require the United States to enact a term extension.1 95
The United States extended its copyright term with passage of the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.196 One of the major purposes of that
extension was to harmonize the law with the level of protection offered in Europe.197

188.
Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
189.
Terms were extended in 1831 and again in 1909, for a potential total of 56
years. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831) (28 years with 14 years
upon renewal); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1080-1081 (1909) (28 years
with 28 more upon renewal).
190.
See Ochoa, supra note 182, at 163-64.
191.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2018).
192.
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988).
193.
See supra note 150.
194.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 12.
195.
Jerome H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural
Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 627 (1996) ("The proposal to extend the basic
term of copyright protection from fifty to seventy years after an author's death, as triggered
by the European Communities' [] Directive to this effect, is not mandated by the [TRIPS
Agreement].").
196.
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2018)).
197.
Eric Schwartz described the discussion in Congress surrounding European
term extension and U.S. term extension as follows:
What the European Union directive said was "If you (another country) do
not give a longer term to our works, we won't give it to your works"that is known as reciprocity. And a lot of older American musical material
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In 1993, the EU lengthened-and harmonized-the copyright term of all of its
member states to life plus 70 years for most works, with 70 years from publication
for the remainder. 198 With the Berne Convention in force and the WTO Agreement
on the horizon, the passage of the extension, which would bring the EU countries
out of harmony with the rest of the world, has been described as "uneventful." 199
The laws and directives being passed in the EU did seek to harmonize the laws of
those countries. 200 However, the changes disharmonized the EU-in copyright
term-from the many countries that granted the Berne Convention minimum
requirement of life plus 50 years. The stated reasoning for the EU extension was to
remain consistent with the Berne Convention purpose of granting a copyright term
that lasted two generations after the life of the author but accounting for increased
life spans. 201 This supposed "purpose" behind the Berne Convention term has been
challenged but remains a basis for the legislative increase in term. 202
Some scholars opposed the U.S. term extension, questioning its economic
merit. 203 But the extension survived a constitutional challenge with the Supreme
Court holding that the extended copyright constituted a "limited time[]" as required
by the Constitution. 204 Some of those who favored copyright term extension
was being broadcast by European broadcast networks, so, not having
protection for those older works meant lost royalties. So, for members of
Congress, all you had to explain to them, which you could do on a one
sheet was, if you pass term extension, royalties will come into the U.S.
economy, which means money into the Treasury in the form of taxes.
Schwartz, supra note 168, at 343.
198.
Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. 290, 9-11.
199.
MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD, P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, STEF VAN GOMPEL, LUCIE
GUIBAULT & NATALI HELBERGER, HARMONIZING EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW: THE
CHALLENGES OF BETTER LAWMAKING 57 (2009).

200.
Id. at 66 (" [T]he ambition of the Term Directive [was] 'to make terms of
protection identical throughout the Community . . . ."'). This harmonization was still
incomplete because of differences in rules of ownership and subject matter. See id. at 62
(explaining that protection may vary across European member states because "many
intellectual creations result from the efforts not of one person, but of several or even a
multitude of actors. As a consequence, although the harmonized norms at first glance suggest
otherwise, for an individual information product the term of protection is not necessarily
identical across Member States . . . [The problem] is caused by incomplete or relatively vague
definitions in the harmonized realm of subject matter and right owners.").
201.
Id. at 58 ("The argument for a seventy-year harmonized term rather than the
fifty-year international standard, is that the average life span in the Community has grown
longer.").
202.
See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 80, §§ 9.08-9.09. There is no
indication that life plus two generations was the reasoning behind the term in the Berne
Convention. See id. §§ 9.14-9.26.
203.
See, e.g., Shauna C. Bryce, Life Plus Seventy: The Extension of Copyright
Terms in the European Union and ProposedLegislation in the United States, 37 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 525, 538-39 (1996); Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term
Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 700 (2000); Marci
A. Hamilton, Copyright DurationExtension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 655 (1996).
204.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189, 194 (2003).
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explained it was necessary for harmonization. 2 0 Other commentators focused on the
interests of American producers and purveyors of cultural capital, arguing that these
interests would be harmed if the United States had a shorter term than other
markets.206 Even this viewpoint, however, suggests that harmonization is the path to
economic- and trade-related goals. 2 0 7 Arguments against copyright extension also
considered the question of harmonization. For example, Jerome Reichman argued
that harmonization and uniform standards could not justify the term extensions
alone. 2 0 Once the United States had increased its term, however, the goal of
encouraging other countries to increase their copyright term became a
harmonization goal-or perhaps a goalpost, and a moving one at that.

-

Once Europe and the United States increased their copyright terms, they
now had interests in persuading others to "harmonize" upwards almost immediately
after the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, through a series of TRIPSplus agreements-trade agreements that increased commitments beyond those of
TRIPS-European countries and the United States included provisions with longer
copyright terms than those provided in the TRIPS Agreement. Not all of the TRIPS
plus agreements addressed term, and a number of countries still have the copyright
term required by the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. 209 For example,
some of the agreements the EU entered into just after the TRIPS Agreement required
only that its partners observe the requirements of the Berne and Paris Conventions.
This includes agreements with Tunisia 210 and Morocco. 211 Both countries were

&

205.
See, e.g., Howard Coble, The Spring 1998 Horace S. Manges Lecture The
105th Congress: Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law, 22 CoLuM.-VLA J.L.
ARTS 269, 296 (1998); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV.
409, 410-11 (2002) ("Those supporting the extension have argued, inter alia, that a longer
term encourages creative activity, that it is necessary to provide incentives to preserve
copyrighted works in the digital age, and that it is necessary to harmonize our copyright laws
with those of other countries."); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Boon for
American Creators and the American Economy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 319, 325
(1998).
206.
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Extending Copyrights Preserves U.S. Culture,
BILLBOARD, Jan. 14, 1995, at 4, reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. 6,554 (1995).
207.
Id. ("By harmonizing our laws with the EU, we can reduce our balance-oftrade deficit, encourage economic investment, strengthen our hand in dealing with intellectual
piracy, and see to it that America's authors, composers, artists, and computer programmers
receive the same level of protection afforded the creative people of other nations.").
208.
J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy,
14 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 626 (1996).
209.
For example, the following countries have copyright terms of life plus fifty for
most works and fifty years from publication for the remainder: China, Zhonghua Renmin
K1XA41 fZ G flfR{t) [Copyright Law of the People's
Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (+
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 26,
2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010) art. 21, 2010 FAGUI HUIBIAN; South Africa, Copyright Act 98
of 1978 § 3; Malaysia, Copyright Act 1987, c. 3, §§ 17-23; Kenya, Copyright Act (2001) Cap.

130 § 23.
210.
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, annex 7, 1998 O.J. (L 97) 2.
211.
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, annex 7, 2000 O.J. (L 70) 2. Morocco was
already a Berne member country since 1971. Morocco Member Page, WIPO.INT,
https://www.wipo.int/members/en/details.jsp?countryid=109 (last visited July 23, 2020).
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TRIPS members,21 and both granted copyright terms of life plus 50 years, as
required by the agreement; thus, the trade agreements with the EU did not impose
any independent requirements on the countries with respect to copyright term
beyond conditioning further preferential trade treatment on continued adherence.
Nonetheless, these treaties paved the way in some cases for future increases in
copyright term. While Tunisia maintains its Berne-consistent term, Morocco has
increased its copyright term. 213
But many treaties concluded around the time of the TRIPS Agreement
required a copyright term of life plus 70 years for flesh-and-blood authors and a 70year term for other works. For example, the 1995 trade treaty between the EU and
Turkey required Turkey to adopt domestic legislation "equivalent to the legislation
adopted in the Community or its Member States," 214 referencing the European
Council Directive that increased the copyright term. 215 This required Turkey to
increase its copyright term. 216 As a result, Turkey implemented a term of life plus
70 years in 1995.21
One study looked broadly at the similarity in various trade agreements and
found that "rich developed states act as rule-makers in bilateral treaty negotiations"
such as those that were made in the 1990s around the time of the TRIPS
Agreement. 218 Many of these bilateral agreements were between the EU and
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, looking to establish trade with Western
Europe and willing to accept the lawmaking of the stronger partner. 2 1 9
The United States also entered into a number of bilateral trade agreements
that required partners to increase copyright term. The United States and Australia

212.
Tunisia joined the WTO on March 29, 1995 and Morocco joined on January
1, 1995. Members and Observers, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_
e/tif-e/org6_e.htm (last visited July 23, 2020).
213.
In 2006, Morocco amended its copyright law to provide for a duration of life
of the author plus 70. Copyright and Related Rights, 2-00, 9 Kaada 1420, 12 (2000),
https://ictpolicyafrica.org/en/document/6aiooiga6ey?page=1.
214.
Council Decision 1/95, annex 8, art. 4, 1996 O.J. (L 35) 1 (EC).
Council Directive 93/98/EEC, pmbl., 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 ("[I]n order to
215.
establish a high level of protection which at the same time meets the requirements of the
internal market and the need to establish a legal environment conducive to the harmonious
development of literary and artistic creation in the Community, the term of protection for
copyright should be harmonized at 70 years after the death of the author or 70 years after the
work is lawfully made available to the public, and for related rights at 50 years after the event
which sets the term running.").
216.
Turkey joined WTO on March 26, 1995 and had implemented a term of life
plus 50 through its accession to the WTO and TRIPS Agreement in 1995. Members and
Observers, supra note 212.
217.

FIKIR VE SENAT ESERLERI KANUNU [LAW ON INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC

WORKS] [CIVIL CODE] no. 5846, art. 27.
218.
Wolfgang Alschner, Julia Seiermann & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Text-as-Data
Analysis of PreferentialTrade Agreements: Mapping the PTA Landscape, at 12, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/SER.RP/2017/5(July 10, 2017) (noting the difference between BITs and PTAs
with respect to whether the more powerful countries dictate terms and structure of
agreements).
219.
See id. at 10-12.

770

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:735

entered into an agreement in 2004 that required a copyright term of life plus 70
years. 220 This move came despite Australia's decision in 2000 not to proceed with
copyright extension, following a government review concluding there was
insufficient evidence that an extension would benefit domestic stakeholders enough
to offset the costs. 221 The United States and Korea entered into a free-trade
agreement in 2008 ("KORUS"), which was implemented in 2012 and was referred
to as "the high water mark of bilateral[] [trade agreements] ."222 Among other things,
KORUS required an extension of copyright term to "not less than the life of the
author and 70 years after the author's death" or, for terms not based on the life of a
natural person, "not less than 70 years from the end of the calendar year of the first
authorized publication of the work .... "223 Like other agreements, KORUS has a
catch-all provision at the beginning of the IP chapter allowing for "more extensive
protection for, and enforcement of, intellectual property rights under its law than
[that] Chapter requires," 2 24 reinforcing that IP agreements are floors, not tools of
harmonization.
In addition to these bilateral agreements, the last decade has seen the
formation of large regional trading blocs, each of which contains IP chapters.
NAFTA, which took effect in 1994, is one such regional agreement. It only required
compliance with other copyright treaties then in force. 225 NAFTA was recently
renegotiated and renamed as the Agreement between the United States of America,
the United Mexican States, and Canada ("new NAFTA" or "USMCA"). 2 2 6 The new
NAFTA includes a minimum copyright term of life plus 70 years for natural persons
and 75 years for terms calculated on other bases. 227 Moreover, it explicitly allows

220.
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, art 17.4.4, May 18, 2004,
T.I.A.S. No. 6422 ("[T]he term of protection of a work (including a photographic work),
performance, or phonogram is to be calculated: (a) on the basis of the life of a natural person,
the term shall be not less than the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death; and
(b) on a basis other than the life of a natural person, the term shall be: (i) not less than 70
years from the end of the calendar year of the first authorised publication of the work,
performance, or phonogram; or (ii) failing such authorised publication within 50 years from
the creation of the work, performance, or phonogram, not less than 70 years from the end of
the calendar year of the creation of the work, performance, or phonogram.").
221.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION REVIEW COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION UNDER THE COMPETITION PRINCIPLES AGREEMENT

80-84 (2000), https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/ergas-report-september_
2000.pdf.; see also Matthew Rimmer, Robbery Under Arms: Copyright Law and the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, FIRST MONDAY, pt. 1 (Mar. 6, 2006),
https://firstmonday.org/oj s/index.php/fm/article/view/1316/1236#note29.
222.
Schwartz, supra note 168, at 342.
223.
KORUS, supra note 23, art. 18.4.
224.
Id. art. 18.1.
225.
NAFTA, supra note 23, art. 1701. The European Union could be included as
an early model of a large, regional trading bloc, too, but because of the strength of its
provisions and the structure of European Union level government that can enforce actual
harmonization, I exclude it from the example.
226.
Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States,
and Canada, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/unitedstates-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USMCA].
227.
Id. art. 20.62.
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for countries to use the rule of the shorter term if they grant a copyright term greater
than that required by the agreement. 2 28 The reason the agreement contemplates this
is likely that Mexico already grants a term of life plus 100 years. 2 2 9 Canada, in
contrast, will need to amend its copyright law to grant the longer term required by
the new agreement. 230 There was pushback in Canada to the term extension, much
like in Korea and Australia, from groups concerned about decreased access to goods
and diminished public domain. Yet the pressure brought to bear by inclusion in trade
agreements ultimately won out, and all of those countries joined the United States
in its longer term.
While the renegotiation of NAFTA was no surprise, a new set of regional
agreements developed in the last five years have the potential to reshape major areas
of trade, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership ("TPP") and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership ("RCEP"). Before discussing these
provisions, however, it is worth noting that the global political environment has very
recently seen a swing of the pendulum away from free trade and towards
protectionist rhetoric. For the reasons described below, it does not seem to have
greatly changed the maximalist view of IP rights stemming from the Global North.
The last five years have been accompanied by a rise in nationalism
worldwide, with a return to some mercantilist, zero-sum views of trade. One of the
elements of this nationalism has been suspicion about free trade and a goal, voiced
by political leaders, to raise barriers to trade in order to protect the interests of
citizens, whether through the protection of jobs or by raising pressure on other
countries as a negotiation tactic. This nationalism has an IP component.2 1 Many of
the countries that have seemingly embraced such ideas, most notably the United
Kingdom and the United States, have in the past pushed for, interalia, lower barriers
to trade through harmonization of IP laws. The new nationalism has manifested in
threats to leave multilateral treaties, such as the United States' withdrawal from the
TPP at a relatively late stage of negotiations and threats to the leave the WTO.232
Even without leaving the WTO, the United States has hamstrung the agreement's
dispute settlement function by refusing to consider new appointments to the

228.
Id. art. 20.63, n.61.
229.
Ley Federal de Derechos de Autor [LFDA] art. 29, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [DOF] 15-6-2018, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/477187.
230.
Nathaniel Lipkus & Jaymie Maddox, A Need-to-Know Guide on IP in the U.S.Mexico-Canada Agreement, OSLER (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.osler.com/en/resources
/cross-border/2018/a-need-to-know-guide-on-ip-in-the-u-s-mexico-canada-agreement.
231.
Sapna Kumar, Innovation Nationalism,51 CONN. L. REV. 205, 228-31 (2019).
232.
In October 2018, trade ministers from 12 countries met to discuss
strengthening the WTO in the wake of threats from the Trump Administration to withdraw
the United States from the agreement. Bryce Baschuk & Josh Wingrove, Trade Chiefs Say
WTO No Longer Sustainableand Needs Reform, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-25/trade-chiefs-say-wto-is-no-longersustainable-and-needs-reform ("Trump has threatened to withdraw from the WTO, repeatedly
attacked the organization as being biased against U.S. interests and is slowly strangling the
appellate body, which mediates trade disputes that affect some of the world's largest
companies.").
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appellate body. 233 The 2016 referendum vote in the United Kingdom to leave the
EU is another example of destabilizing nationalism and protectionism with
complicated implications for international trade. 2 4
The rise of nationalist and protectionist leaders, rhetoric, and foreign policy
should logically accompany an abandonment of IP's harmonization goals. At the
same time, maximization is consistent with policy that privileges domestic
interest-for developed countries. And despite the increasing fragmentation,
withdrawals, and potential withdrawals from various trade agreements,
maximization continues. For example, the Trump administration announced its
withdrawal from the TPP in early 2017. The negotiations for that trade agreement
included maximizing IP provisions, such as the requirement of a copyright term of
life of the author plus 70 years. The negotiations for that agreement continued
without the United States, as discussed below. Importantly, the new NAFTA
replicated the same term provisions. This demonstrated that increasingly nationalist
rhetoric in a number of developed countries has not driven a corresponding increase
in belief in flexibility for countries to implement IP protection at lower levels if that
is consistent with their national interests. Thus, for example, it was not so long after
the TPP withdrawal that the United States announced its intention to renegotiate
NAFTA. 23 As discussed above, the current draft of the new NAFTA includes the
life-plus-70-year terms. 23 6 Moreover, as Wolfgang Alschner and Rama PanfordWalsh have shown, the new NAFTA includes much of the language of the drafts of
the TPP, with a 66% similarity in their IP chapters. 23 7 Thus, despite protectionist
rhetoric and even withdrawals from major trade agreements, the maximalist
language survives to be included in other agreements.
233.
Id. ("Over the past year, the U.S. has refused to consider any appellate body
appointments because it says the forum's current members have strayed from their original
mandate. The three judges remaining are the bare minimum required to adjudicate appellate
cases. If the U.S. allows the terms of two of the three remaining appellate body members to
expire in December 2019, it would essentially paralyze the WTO's ability to arbitrate trade
disputes.").
234.
See, e.g., Sean Morrison, No-Deal Brexit Gamble 'Will Put Jobs and
Livelihoods at Risk, 'MPs Warn, EVENING STANDARD (July 19, 2019), https://www.standard.
co.uk/news/politics/brexit-news-latest-nodeal-exit-could-cause-severe-disruption-to-theeconomy-putting-jobs-and-a4193471.html (quoting members of Parliament who warn about
severe disruption to trade, including negative impact on the farming and automotive
industries, as well as concerns about patient safety and care in the event that the UK leaves
the European Union without an independent trade deal).
235.
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trump Admin.
Announces Intent to Renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (May 18, 2017),
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Representative, to Congressional Leaders (May 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
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specifically, as an area of interest for reform).
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Wolfgang Alschner & Rama Panford-Walsh, How Much of the Transpacific
PartnershipIs in the United States-Mexico-CanadaAgreement? 15, 19-20 (Ottawa Faculty
of Law, Working Paper No. 2019-28, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=3410658.

2020]

THE HARMONIZATION MYTH

773

Once the United States left negotiations for the TPP, other countries
continued negotiations. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (the "CPTPP") was signed in March 2018 and entered into force
for signatories at the end of 2018.238 The first six countries to ratify the agreement
were Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singapore. The CPTPP
requires a minimum copyright term of life plus 70 years for works based on the
natural life of the author. 239 For other works, the term is required to be 70 years from
the year of first publication.2 40 The maximization of copyright term is being exported
through regional agreements.
Another regional treaty, the RCEP, has emerged-but not yet been
concluded-in some contrast to the maximizing agreements mentioned above. In
November 2018, the 16 signatory countries agreed that they aimed to conclude the
agreement in 2019." The agreement would include China, Japan, South Korea,
India, Australia, and New Zealand and encompass approximately 3.5 billion people,
or 45% of the world population, and more than a third of the world GDP. 4 2 RCEP
would require lower levels of IP protection than other agreements and is seen in
many ways as a China-driven agreement that will enhance trade between China,
India, and Japan and lessen the effects of the United States' trade wars.2 4 3 Although
it is unclear if the potential members will come to an agreement, a draft of the
agreement leaked in 2015. That draft did not include longer copyright terms. Instead,
it references the term included in the Berne Convention (and incorporated by
reference in TRIPS).2 4
Through bilateral and regional treaties, following the TRIPS Agreement's
potential to harmonize copyright term globally, countries in the Global North have
instead pushed for piecemeal increases to term. As a result, there is a bimodal
distribution of global copyright term, not harmonization. Countries may choose to
"harmonize up" to the longer term length, and through the use of treaties, they have
been encouraged to do just that. But there is no option for harmonizing down to the
standard that has true global agreement by now.
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C. Term Extensions in Patent Law
Patent term, like copyright term, is a blunt on-off switch for the exclusive
rights it offers to inventors. Many acknowledge that a single, standardized term for
all fields of technology is unlikely to be economically efficient. And many patents
are not valuable for their entire term, as demonstrated by the number of patent
holders who allow patents to expire through failure to pay maintenance fees. 4 5 For
example, there are wildly different time frames for innovation and discovery in
different fields. Inventions that move a field forward may be obsolete before 20
years have expired in fields like software development, and there is a potential for
broadly worded patents to block follow-on innovation. In other areas, like drug
development, a single pharmaceutical product may remain an important and useful
discovery for much longer. Moreover, because of the high levels of investment
required in drug development, the length of time regulatory examination takes, and
the ease of reverse-engineering drug discoveries, a longer term for pharmaceutical
products than for other areas might make sense in order to allow companies to
recoup costs.2 46 Nonetheless, there are good reasons not to explicitly discriminate
among fields for patent term length. One example is that it is difficult to draw lines
between scientific fields prospectively, given the dynamic and unpredictable nature
of scientific research. Moreover, such line-drawing would likely affect investment
among fields and invite lobbying and litigation over nascent technologies and their
appropriate classifications.
In the United States, the patent term has changed from its first incarnation,
albeit not as radically as the copyright term. Under the first federal patent act in
1790, patents were to be granted for up to 14 years. 4 7 In 1836, the statute was
amended to allow for a seven-year extension of the term. 2 48 Then in 1861, the patent
term was amended to a single, fixed term of 17 years from the date of filing which
remained the term for over a century until the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated,
requiring a 20-year term from the date of filing. 2 4 9 The United States changed its
law in order to conform with the TRIPS Agreement and international norms. The
change from a term based on the issuance date to one based on the filing date for a
patent application probably was not a drastic change on average, given that patent
examination often takes a bit less than three years, and it may well be that the "vast
majority of patentees . . . benefit[ted] from the new law" 250 by gaining in patent
term. However, in some instances, it could be a significant shortening of the term,
such as for patents that issued as a continuation of an earlier-filed patent. In fact, the
potential for patents to issue as continuations from earlier-filed patents had become

245.
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somewhat of a problem at the time, and the change in term was meant in part to
address the issue of so-called "submarine patents," with their potential to pop up
unannounced and surprise competitors. 21 In this sense, the move to a term based on
a filing date was desirable, but it is also worth noting that it could be a decrease in
term.
Despite the now 20-year patent term in the United States-and all WTO
member countries-not all patents expire 20 years after their filing date. There is a
set of provisions in U.S. law that predates the TRIPS Agreement and allows for
significant patent term extensions either to make up for regulatory delay at the patent
office or to account for the time spent seeking regulatory approval for
pharmaceutical products from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). The
Hatch-Waxman Act balances the interests of various groups, such as pharmaceutical
innovators, generic drug companies, and patient groups in a complex legal
scheme.25 Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, every company seeking to market a drug
had to engage in lengthy and expensive testing to prove its efficacy. 253 Moreover, if
a drug was still under patent, generic drug companies could not engage in that testing
until the patent had expired; otherwise the tests would constitute infringement.2 4
This meant that patented drug-makers received a de facto extension of their patents
during the time that generic drug manufacturers were going through the approval
process. Moreover, it meant that generic drug companies were engaged in testing
drugs that had already been tested by the patent-holding pharmaceutical company
which was duplicative. In addition, because generic drug-makers would not receive
patent exclusivity, it was harder to recoup the cost of testing, leading to a concern
that generic market entry was being discouraged by the high costs of approval. 2 5
The Hatch-Waxman Act sought to encourage earlier generic market entry and save
on the redundancy of testing by allowing generic drug-makers to rely on the results
of the patent-holding, or pioneer, drug-makers. However, because the pioneer drugmakers generally file for a patent and then go through the lengthy, regulatory
approval process, the Hatch-Waxman Act allowed for extension of the patent term
as a balancing measure, recognizing that pioneer drug-makers were still required to
go through a lengthy process while generic drug-makers no longer are. In this way,
the law was a "calibrat[ion] ... of costs and incentives for both innovating firms and
generic competitors." 256 In addition to offering patent term extension to pioneer
drug-makers, the law provides for "pseudo-patent" protection in the form of fiveyear market exclusivity for new chemical entities and semi-exclusivity for generic
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companies that apply to market a generic drug and challenge the validity of pioneer
patents. 2 7
Immediately following the TRIPS Agreement, these regulatory extensions
began to make their way into the various bilateral and free-trade agreements as
permissive measures. In contrast, in the more recent wave of negotiations of regional
trade agreements, the United States has sought to include a version of its own patent
term extensions as a minimum requirement in treaties. In other words, where earlier
agreements stated members "may" provide for patent term extension, the more
recent agreements state members "shall" provide for patent term extensions.
The KORUS agreement requires that parties adjust patent terms for
unreasonable agency delays, at least when the delay is four or more years from the
application date or three or more years from the examination request date. The
KORUS agreement also requires that parties make available patent term extension
for "unreasonable curtailment" of the term resulting from marketing approval
processes for pharmaceutical products or processes. The requirement states that the
adjustment "shall confer all of the exclusive rights, subject to the same limitations
and exceptions" as the original patent. 2 8 While requiring the availability of patent
term extension, the KORUS does not state the length of the required extension.
While the 1994 NAFTA agreement permitted countries to allow for patent
term extension, 2 59 new NAFTA requires patent term extension for unreasonable
delay, which is defined as more than five years from filing or three years from the
examination request. 2 60 The language requires that members provide a means for
requesting the adjustment and that they "shall, adjust the term" at the request of the
patent owner. 2 6 1 However, it does not state how long of an extension should be
available. Similarly, the agreement requires parties to adjust patent terms to account
for market approval for pharmaceutical products. 2 62 There is no cap on how long the
extension can be. In a footnote, the agreement allows for sui generis protection rather
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than patent term extension, as long as it confers the same rights as a patent.2 63
(Market exclusivity is one example of sui generis protection that can be shaped to
provide the same rights as a patent.)
The CPTPP also includes required patent term extensions, stating that the
extensions "shall" be provided for regulatory delay2 64 or for marketing approval. 265
That said, member countries have flexibility in shaping the conditions and
limitations for extensions based on marketing approval of pharmaceutical
products. 266 By requiring that extensions be available but failing to specify how long
those extensions can be or how they should be calculated, the CPTPP, like other
agreements, provides opportunities for countries to grant patent terms of differing
lengths.
Perhaps surprisingly, given its otherwise minimalist nature, the IP chapter
of RCEP leaked in 2015 provided for a patent term extension of up to at least five
years for marketing approval. 267 There was also a (disputed) provision for restoration
of patent term for unreasonable delay in patent examination. 2 68 As discussed above,
a formal copy of RCEP has not been made public, and it is unclear what stage the
negotiations have reached. However, like the other regional agreements, RCEP has
the potential to require patent term extensions of its members.
These agreements discussed above are maximizing instruments for patent
term. By providing for term extensions, the provisions allow for the possibility of
terms that run longer than the TRIPS-required 20-year minimum. But it is more than
that. It is also disharmonizing. Unlike the copyright extension provisions discussed
in the previous Part, patent term extensions are necessarily variable because they
depend on the circumstances of individual administrative processes. Not only will
terms vary from patent to patent within a country depending on the length of
administrative processes, but because there are not harmonized standards for
determining the appropriate lengths of extensions, the terms will vary for a single
invention with identical patent applications filed in multiple countries. The
provisions are therefore both maximizing and explicitly disharmonizing. Just as in
the case of copyright extensions, the Global North has chosen maximization over
harmonization for patent-rights duration. The copyright term extensions are of
greater duration, but the patent term extensions increase uncertainty by providing
for potentially multiple different terms in different countries.
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IV. VALUING FLEXIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL IP
Dispelling the harmonization myth is descriptively important; it is
inaccurate, as demonstrated by the inclusion of term-extension provisions in postTRIPS treaties that have resulted in less harmonized, but more protective, IP rights.
But while an accurate description is important in its own right, it is also important
to a normative assessment of IP protections that are exported and required of trading
partners without empirical or economic justification. Developed countries and
certain industry interest groups justify increases in IP protection under the guise of
harmonization, touting the efficiency savings to companies that can rely on similar
protections in multiple markets. However, if industry groups that rely on IP rights
generally lobby for maximization over harmonization when given the chance, the
efficiency gains must not be so valuable after all. Changes in law result in less
certainty for investors, and yet these same investors pursue changes that maximize
protection rather than static-yet-certain laws.
Nevertheless, certain objections to the myth characterization deserve
consideration. For example, to the extent that longer terms for copyright or the
tradeoffs embodied in patent term extension are normatively desirable, the story of
the previous Part may yet be a happy one. Moreover, term length is but one
characteristic of IP protection. Other characteristics might tell a more nuanced story.
Recent initiatives demonstrate concerted attempts to moderate the maximization of
IP rights. These objections have some merit but still demonstrate how flexibilities
are often cast against a default rule of maximization-cast-as-harmonization. After
describing the drawbacks to IP law maximization and responding to potential
objections, this Part explores potential antidotes to the harmonization myth that has
driven IP protection upward for at least the 25 years since the TRIPS Agreement
entered into force. These solutions range from eliminating treaty terms that put
pressure on member countries to constantly increase protection upward to
refocusing the conversation surrounding trade-related aspects of IP to allow for and
welcome certain levels of diversity among domestic IP laws-whether those
measures depart upward or downward from international norms.
A. The Drawbacks of IP Maximalism and the Harmonization Myth
There are several drawbacks to the "global IP upward ratchet"2 6 9 and the
increases in the duration of IP protection it has encouraged. The ever-increasing
minimum rights included in treaties and the opportunistic regime-shifting by the
Global North described in the previous Part make it harder for all countries to
implement normatively desirable levels of IP protection. This is true whether the
normative desirability of terms is measured country by country or globally. That is,
even if there is a single, best term length for copyright and patent protection, the
current structure of international agreements makes it less likely that countries will
discover-or be able to enact-that term. In addition, the characteristics of the
various treaties have cast increases of protection as unassailable exercises of
domestic power, while decreases or lessening of protection require justification as
"exceptions" or "flexibilities." As a result, developing and least-developed countries
are constrained from exploring levels of IP protection that best fit their domestic
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interests when those differ from the interests of developed countries. Lastly, the
rhetorical power of inaccurately naming the changes that increase protection,
"harmonization," imbues maximizing measures with an unmerited, default
legitimacy. As discussed above, minimum standards of protections are not
harmonizing-in law 270 or in fact. 27 1
The normatively desirable term length for copyright or patent protection is
a question open to debate. There are serious arguments that copyright term is longer
than it needs to be. 272 The longer copyright term lasts, the more likely there are to
be high information costs to consumers and other artists who must determine what
is in the public domain or find copyright owners years down the line to request
permission to use works that may have been created well over a century ago. 2 73 And
as discussed above, the 20-year term is not one that was chosen on the basis of an
empirical evaluation of the ideal term length.274 As a result, it is unlikely that this
particular number of years is the ideal one for a given country's interest, let alone
globally. Moreover, a number of legal and economic scholars have critiqued the way
that patent terms apply uniformly across technological fields because fields differ so
greatly in terms of the cost and length of research and development. 275 Because
patents are neutral as to technology, term lengths are not tailored by industryalthough the patent term extension provisions for pharmaceuticals, discussed above,
are one means of increasing term in a single industry. Generally, however, the same
term applies to inventions in fields that move incredibly quickly, such as software,
as to inventions in fields in which innovation takes years, such as the pharmaceutical
industry. 276 Thus, even if 20 years is the "right" term for some industries, it is
unlikely to be the right term for all industries. There are good reasons not to treat
industries differently, such as the difficulty of line-drawing and the potential for
lobbying and public choice problems if industries are treated differently. However,
the fact remains that 20 years is unlikely to be the ideal patent term-and even if it
is for the United States, it may well not be elsewhere. By fixing terms in treaties,
countries in the Global North are tying their own hands when it comes to
experimentation with term length-betting that whatever the ideal term is, it is equal
to or greater than those being negotiated in treaties. This is problematic because even
if domestic interests are in favor of the current terms of protection (and there has
been pushback against those), there is no opportunity to make changes in the future,
absent widespread agreement globally.
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Moreover, developing countries are tied to terms that may not be ideal for
their interests. Countries in the Global South have varied domestic priorities, with
some valuing access, whether to drugs or creative expression, more highly than the
grant of incentives that will redound, for the most part, to foreign industries.
However, these countries are unable to unilaterally shorten the terms of protection
even if they so desire. Because the treaty provisions discussed above are all cast as
floors-but not ceilings-for term, they leave little flexibility going forward. This
means that, regardless of whether the chosen term is longer than the "ideal" level of
IP protection, changes would require treaty amendments. Moreover, because many
countries sign multiple treaties with similar language, any changes would have to be
replicated in many, parallel negotiations.
Last, it is worth noting that there is rhetorical power in casting all
protection-increasing measures as harmonizing and all access-increasing measures
as exceptions or flexibilities. The intentions behind the exploration of flexibilities
are good. For example, the TRIPS Agreement recognizes national development
objectives,2 7 7 while in 2001, the Ministerial Conference issued a Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the "Doha Declaration"), which served to
somewhat formalize a commitment to access to medicines.2 78 And the scholars who
have explored the use of TRIPS flexibilities have generally done so with an eye
toward striking a balance between the interests of rights holders and the needs and
interests of consumers and downstream creators and inventors. 2 79 Nevertheless,
there is a sense in which the term "flexibility" is ceding the moral high ground to
harmonization. This may make sense if harmonization is a purpose that is highly
valued by most negotiating members and if it is valuable enough that any deviation
from harmonized IP rights requires some sort of cost-benefit analysis. However,
where countries pursue measures that move their laws out of harmony without the
same level of scrutiny, it becomes more difficult to justify such scrutiny for
developing countries looking to implement disharmonizing measures.
B. Counterarguments and Responses
The preceding Parts show how term limits that were ostensibly harmonized
by the TRIPS Agreement have been maximized in subsequent treaties. However,
some objections to the myth characterization deserve consideration; duration of
rights is certainly not the only measure of IP rights protection. Other characteristics
of IP rights protection may not show the same maximization story as that of term.
20
For example, the Doha Declaration expanded the use of compulsory licensing.
The Doha Declaration allowed for countries to grant compulsory licenses to address
health crises in other countries, in recognition of the fact that not all countries had
pharmaceutical industries at the ready in the case of public health crises. 28 1 In a
sense, this was a downward modification of TRIPS standards of IP rights protection.
While an important modification to the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration
essentially fixed a problem associated with the inflexible wording of the initial
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agreement that could have terrible consequences for least developed countries in the
midst of health crises. The "costs" associated with this decrease in rights were likely
minimal, as the problem for least developed countries was that they had neither
economic resources to address the AIDS crisis nor industrial resources to provide
generic medicines to the population.
Another recent treaty affecting IP rights is the Treaty to Facilitate Access
to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise
Print Disabled ("Marrakesh Treaty").2 82 The Marrakesh Treaty was negotiated
through WIPO and signed in 2013.283 It was, as Marketa Trimble points out, an
agreement that brought together developing and developed countries despite "the
atmosphere of growing opposition from many experts and the general public to
international IP treaties."2 84 The treaty seeks to increase access to copyrighted works
for the blind and visually impaired, thereby augmenting users' interests and arguably
weakening copyright. It requires countries to provide certain exceptions and
limitations designed in the treaty to facilitate cross-border access to works that are
fixed in accessible format copies. 285 While the Marrakesh Treaty is certainly
important for the users whose interests it protects, it may, like the Doha Declaration,
be a fairly low-cost concession made by developed countries. This is not to suggest
that it has been made in bad faith-merely that it is not a sweeping lowering of IP
protection the way that a 20-year term increase is a sweeping increase.
These two treaties are examples of agreements to limit IP protection
through the treaty-making process, and thus constitute a counterexample to the
maximization examples of term. They demonstrate that maximization is not the only
motivating factor behind post-TRIPS Agreement treaty negotiation. And the
purposes of both the declaration and the treaty are laudable and should not be
minimized. At the same time, maximization need not be the sole purpose in order
for it to be a driving force in many negotiations. There are also many other
characteristics of copyright and patent protection that have been subject to increased
minimum standards through post-TRIPS treaty-making, too. The usefulness of term
is that without harmonization in term, there are immediate variations between
countries. Duration, therefore, should be one of the areas subject to the strongest
efforts at harmonization. Given the tolerance of variance, it undermines the
harmonization narrative. Nonetheless, it is worth acknowledging that maximization
is certainly not the sole motivator of the Global North since the TRIPS Agreement.
It is, however, a powerful motivator and frequently more powerful than
harmonization.
C. Developing Dynamic IP
Once the diminished role of harmonization-and the central role of
maximization-is apparent, what are the implications for international IP treatymaking and law-making? A number of solutions to the harmonization myth would
282.
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https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/marrakesh [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty].

283.

Id.

284.
285.

Marketa Trimble, The Marrakesh Puzzle, 45 IIC 768, 769 (2014).
Id. at 772; Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 282, art. 2(a)-(b).

782

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:735

make sense. First, treaty provisions that invite maximization ought potentially to be
abandoned. The rule of the shorter term is one such provision. Second, discussions
of international IP rulemaking should not dismiss the value of diversity among IP
regimes so easily. There may be cases in which harmonized laws are indeed the most
desirable, but that should not be such an easy assumption, whether or not potential
laws are an upward departure or downward departure from the "standard" level of
protection. Last, even without major changes to IP treaties or methods of evaluating
proposed treaty provisions, there is value in recognizing that a standard description
is inaccurate, and that the rhetoric carries a normative weight that is unearned.
The rule of the shorter term is hard to justify in the modern system of IP
protection. The EU adoption of the rule-as permitted by treaty-has led to much
mischief, driving the United States to increase term despite great pushback
domestically. 286 Then, once the EU and the United States both had increased
copyright term, the countries used their heft in trade negotiations to push increased
terms on other countries, despite there being no empirical support for the increases.
As a result, there is a roughly bimodal distribution of copyright terms, worldwide,
and copyright protection is needlessly long in many countries. The rule of the shorter
term also violates the national treatment provision 287 that is a cornerstone of trade
agreements-and now is standard in international IP agreements as well. This means
that the rule allows countries to treat works originating in foreign countries
differently than works originating domestically (if those foreign countries have
shorter copyright terms). As a result, copyright protection in countries adhering to
the rule differs in length, depending on who is receiving the protection, thus
increasing information costs to users who are interested in accessing works. Given
these drawbacks, the benefits of the rule do not outweigh the negatives. In theory,
the rule results in less protection for some works, which corresponds with greater
access to those works. And although, theoretically, creators in the United States
could have looked at their treatment on the European market and said "our treatment
there reflects the way we value access at home, by matching the terms," the actual
outcome-lobbying for longer terms-is the more likely one. As a result, the rule
does not serve to recognize the differing policy decisions of foreign countries but
rather serves as the "ratchet," discussed above, that drives IP rights duration everupward.
In addition to removing incentives to increase IP rights protection upward,
recognizing harmonization as a myth suggests a more critical evaluation of IP rights
measures in bilateral and regional treaties, generally. This is particularly necessary
when such measures are justified primarily because they serve to harmonize rights
and particularly when the arguments are used to encourage increases in IP rights.
While harmonization in procedure of rights acquisition, substance, and enforcement
may be desirable, the value of diverse rights in IP should not be discounted.
Diversity in IP regimes can allow countries to tailor rights to their domestic
interests. 288 Moreover, as rights are consistently increased through appeals to
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harmonization, it becomes less and less likely that an "ideal" level of rights will be
found.
The weak version of this suggestion is that future increases should be
looked on skeptically as simply more "harmonizing up" that will not result in true
stability, and instead the virtues of diverse IP regimes should be weighted more
strongly. A stronger version of the suggestion would require rethinking the
minimum rights already in place in numerous treaties. While this is likely politically
unworkable given the number of interwoven and duplicative treaties that enforce
minimum standards of IP protection, it may be a worthwhile thought experiment: if
countries that sought harmonized copyright protection determined that a 20-year
increase was not a hindrance to trade, why not consider a 20-year decrease in
copyright term? In other words, for every significant increase to IP rights, one might
assume that a proportional decrease in protection must be tolerable from the
perspective of international trade.
Ultimately, many increases in IP rights protection are likely irreversible
under the current system of interlocking and interdependent treaties and trade
relationships because of their complexity. And it is entirely possible that the current
levels of IP protection are relatively ideal or that stronger IP protection would be
ideal. However, if that is so, then any future increases should be argued for on their
merits, rather than pushed through with hollow appeals to harmonization. After all,
it seems harmonization was never the primary goal.
CONCLUSION
Harmonization played a central role in international IP law treaty-making
in the years leading up to the TRIPS Agreement. However, it is a concept that does
not fit much of the treaty-making that has occurred in the years since the agreement
came into force. While it has great explanatory power for the sweeping changes that
the TRIPS Agreement required, allowing rights holders to expect similar structures
and scope to their IP rights, globally, it is neither a desirable nor practical end goal
for IP rights to be completely harmonized.
This realization that harmonization is not as valuable as previously thought
is borne out by the negotiating behavior of countries most in favor of harmonization,
and it requires a rethinking of international IP law and its trajectory. The Global
North countries-initial proponents of harmonized IP laws-have repeatedly
negotiated for longer terms of protection in copyright and patent law, even though
the longer terms bring duration out of harmony. And in the case of patents, the
requirement for term extensions may result in different and unpredictable terms from
country to country, even more varied than the bimodal distribution that copyright
term increases have created. The strategies of the Global North countries in
increasing term-to the detriment of harmonization-show that there are limits to
the desirability of harmonization as a goal for all countries. It makes sense, then, to
view new proposed increases to IP protection critically. These increases can come
with serious costs to access and other domestic interests, which are frequently
dismissed when the harmonization narrative is strong. Countries should evaluate
such measures without the sheen of harmonization. Moreover, treaty measures that
increase pressure to maximize IP rights protection-such as the rule of the shorter
term-undermine harmonization and put a finger on the scale for maximization. The
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rule is hard to support given that it does not comport with the rule of national
treatment that is a cornerstone of free-trade agreements, and even harder given its
maximizing pressure. It is time to rethink international IP, free of the harmonization
myth.

